



## Statement of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce

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**ON: Examining the CFPB's Proposed Rulemaking on Arbitration: Is it in the Public Interest and for the Protection of Consumers**

**TO: House Committee on Financial Services,  
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit**

**BY: Andrew Pincus, Partner, Mayer Brown, LLP (on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce)**

**DATE: May 18, 2016**

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1615 H Street NW | Washington, DC | 20062

The Chamber's mission is to advance human progress through an economic, political and social system based on individual freedom,

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is the world's largest business federation representing the interests of more than 3 million businesses of all sizes, sectors, and regions, as well as state and local chambers and industry associations. The Chamber is dedicated to promoting, protecting, and defending America's free enterprise system.

More than 96% of Chamber member companies have fewer than 100 employees, and many of the nation's largest companies are also active members. We are therefore cognizant not only of the challenges facing smaller businesses, but also those facing the business community at large.

Besides representing a cross-section of the American business community with respect to the number of employees, major classifications of American business—e.g., manufacturing, retailing, services, construction, wholesalers, and finance—are represented. The Chamber has membership in all 50 states.

The Chamber's international reach is substantial as well. We believe that global interdependence provides opportunities, not threats. In addition to the American Chambers of Commerce abroad, an increasing number of our members engage in the export and import of both goods and services and have ongoing investment activities. The Chamber favors strengthened international competitiveness and opposes artificial U.S. and foreign barriers to international business.

The U.S. Chamber's Institute for Legal Reform is an affiliate of the Chamber dedicated to making our nation's overall civil legal system simpler, fairer, and faster for all participants.

**Testimony of Andrew Pincus,  
Partner, Mayer Brown LLP on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce**

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**CHAIRMAN NEUGEBAUER, RANKING MEMBER CLAY, AND MEMBERS OF THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE:**

I am honored to appear before the Subcommittee today on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and its Center on Capital Markets Competitiveness (“CCMC”) and the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform (“ILR”).

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce (the “Chamber”), the world’s largest business federation representing the interests of more than three million businesses of all sizes, sectors and regions, as well as state and local chambers and industry associations, is dedicated to promoting, protecting and defending America’s free enterprise system. The Chamber created CCMC to promote a modern and effective regulatory structure for capital markets to fully function in a 21<sup>st</sup> century economy. ILR is an affiliate of the Chamber dedicated to making our nation’s overall civil legal system simpler, faster, and fair for all participants.

The anti-arbitration rule proposed by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the “Bureau” or “CFPB”)—if finalized by the Bureau and upheld by the courts—is bad for business and bad for consumers. The rule will harm consumers rather than help them by:

- Eliminating access to justice available to consumers through arbitration and relegating consumers to lawyer-controlled class actions that provide little benefit to consumers; and
- Increasing the cost to consumers of financial goods and services without any corresponding benefit.

Before explaining what arbitration is, how it benefits consumers, and why the Bureau's proposal will harm consumers, three preliminary points are important.

**First**, as a lawyer, nothing would make me happier than to tell this Subcommittee that our court systems are functioning well and that individuals have a realistic chance to vindicate their rights in court no matter how small the claim. Unfortunately, neither of those things are true. That is why we have a very significant access-to-justice problem in this country that is the topic of numerous articles in legal publications and appeals for charitable donations by bar associations and related groups.

I also would like to be able to say that the class action device effectively vindicates class members' interests and ensures that the interests of class members outweigh those of lawyers (both plaintiff and defense). But, again, experience with the class action system—as well as empirical analysis—leaves no doubt that the current system has major problems.

Arbitration addresses these flaws in our court systems, providing a fair, quick, and cheaper means of vindicating claims. It empowers individuals, freeing them from reliance on lawyers. And it harnesses technology to make dispute resolution easy to access and claims easy to prosecute.

Numerous government and business processes have been modified to use technology to increase efficiency and access. The same approach is appropriate for dispute resolution.

**Second**, the Subcommittee should view the Bureau's rulemaking in context. The rule is part of a widespread attack on arbitration, championed by those with a vested interest in the judicial litigation system—such as lawyers who are able to reap large fees from class actions. Although the Federal Arbitration Act, enacted in 1925, continues to embody Congress's preference for a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,”<sup>1</sup> which the Supreme Court has upheld time and time again,<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.*, 460 U.S. 24-25 (1983). Over the past two decades, the Supreme Court has repeatedly enforced arbitration agreements. See, e.g., *Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant*, 570 U.S. \_\_\_\_ (2013); *Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC v. Howard*, 568 U.S. \_\_\_\_ (2012); *Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown*, 565 U.S. \_\_\_\_ (2012); *CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood*, 565 U.S. \_\_\_\_ (2012); *KPMG LLP v. Cocchi*, 565 U.S. \_\_\_\_ (2011); *AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); *Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson*, 561 U.S. 63 (2010); *14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett*, 556 U.S. 247 (2009); *Preston v. Ferrer*, 552 U.S. 346 (2008) (Ginsburg, J.); *Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna*, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); *Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.*, 539 U.S. 52 (2003); *Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto*, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.); *Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson*, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (Breyer, J.).

there have been numerous Executive Branch efforts to undermine parties' rights to enforce contractual arbitration agreements:

- The Department of Education's March 11, 2016, announcement that it will take steps to end the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in enrollment agreements at institutions of higher learning<sup>2</sup>;
- The Department of Labor's proposed fiduciary duty rule, which restricts the use of arbitration<sup>3</sup>;
- The FCC's request, in a rulemaking ostensibly focused on consumer privacy, for comments on whether it should prohibit broadband internet service providers from using arbitration with their customers<sup>4</sup>; and
- The NLRB's efforts to invalidate arbitration clauses in employment agreements, which have been set aside by every appellate court to address the issue.<sup>5</sup>

In each of these circumstances, the agency alleges that only a court can properly vindicate the type of legal claim at issue, but those assertions are based on a theoretical assessment of the benefits of class actions that bears no relation to reality and on ignoring the benefits to consumers from arbitration.

**Third**, although the CFPB's proposal is framed as a requirement that consumers be able to participate in class actions, it will have the very same practical effect as a rule banning pre-dispute arbitration. That is because companies bear all, or virtually all of the costs of arbitration, and those costs can be significant—maintaining a pre-arbitration settlement process and covering all (or nearly all) filing fees, arbitrator fees, and the like. They are willing to do so because they don't have to pay

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<sup>2</sup> U.S. Dep't of Educ., Press Release, U.S. Department of Education Takes Further Steps to Protect Students from Predatory Higher Education Institutions, Mar. 11, 2016, <http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-takes-further-steps-protect-students-predatory-higher-education-institutions>.

<sup>3</sup> *Definition of the Term "Fiduciary"; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement Investment Advice*, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,945 (Apr. 8, 2016).

<sup>4</sup> *Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services*, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,360, 23,393-94 (Apr. 20, 2016).

<sup>5</sup> See, e.g., *D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB*, 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013); *Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP*, 726 F.3d 290, 297 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013); *Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc.*, 702 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 2013); *Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC*, 327 P.3d 129, 142 (Cal. 2014).

the litigation costs associated with class actions: all of their disputes are resolved in one system, arbitration.

No rational business will pay the costs associated with two systems. Forcing them to spend the millions in legal fees it costs to defend against class actions, and they will drop arbitration rather than voluntarily take on duplicative dispute resolution expenditures. Indeed, that is what companies did before the Supreme Court’s 2011 *AT&T v. Concepcion* decision upheld the enforceability of class waivers—they wrote their arbitration clauses to eliminate arbitration if the law required them to defend against class actions.<sup>6</sup>

### ***The CFPB’s Unfair, Closed Study Process.***

The critical policy question that the CFPB should have addressed is whether the benefits that consumers obtain from class actions are so great that it is worth sacrificing the benefits that consumers gain from arbitration. And, that question should have been assessed based on how class actions work in the real world, not how they are supposed to work on paper. The CFPB’s study and proposed rule, instead, take it on faith that class actions are beneficial to American consumers. But that faith is deeply misguided. And, the Bureau’s assessment of arbitration’s benefits is similarly flawed.

The Bureau’s approach was simply to follow the plaintiff’s bar attacks on arbitration that rest entirely on theory, not reality. The claims that class actions provide “access to justice” and that arbitration can’t do so are grounded in an assessment of these dispute resolution mechanisms are entirely disconnected from reality and an overly idealized view of class action litigation.

To evaluate the effect of the Bureau’s proposal, it is essential to understand arbitration, class actions, and the real-world trade-offs associated with eliminating arbitration in favor of class actions.

The Bureau failed to undertake that inquiry.

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<sup>6</sup> Thus, one group of businesses explained to the Supreme Court in 2011 that, “when there is no assurance that all claims will be arbitrated in lieu of litigation, and a [company] must shoulder the additional costs of class action litigation, subsidizing the costs of individual arbitration is no longer a rational business option”; the only logical decision is to “disengage from arbitration altogether.” Brief for CTIA—the Wireless Association as Amicus Curiae at 21, *AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the effect of the CFPB's proposal is directly at odds with the Bureau's consumer-protection mission: the closed, nontransparent process that gave birth to the proposed rule was flawed from the start.

Congress directed the Bureau to study arbitration, and use the study's findings as the basis for any proposal to regulate arbitration. The Bureau's response was to solicit public comment once, at the outset of the study process, and never again for the three years that the study was underway. The Bureau never informed the public of the topics it had decided to study and never sought public comment on them—even though a number of commenters suggested that the Bureau utilize that procedure. The Bureau never convened public roundtable discussions on key issues, as many other agencies routinely do. And the Bureau never sought public input on its tentative findings.<sup>7</sup>

The product of this closed process is flawed in numerous respects. The Bureau's study:

- ignores the practical benefits of the procedures available in arbitration as compared to the court system for vindicating the types of disputes that consumers most often have;
- fails to consider the benefits that arbitration can provide to injured parties in a variety of contexts—benefits that plainly would accrue to consumers as well if they were not discouraged by plaintiffs' lawyers and others from invoking arbitration;
- fails to consider the reduced transaction costs resulting from arbitration, which under basic economic theory produce lower prices to consumers;
- exaggerates the supposed benefits of class actions to consumers and ignores the grossly disproportionate gains reaped by self-interested plaintiffs' lawyers; and

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<sup>7</sup> The Bureau staff would meet with interested parties and accept written submissions. But the staff refused to provide any information regarding the topics that the Bureau was studying or the timeline for its study process, and those one-way conversations therefore did not permit anything resembling meaningful input.

- ignores the significant role of government enforcement—particularly the CFPB’s own enforcement and supervision processes—in protecting consumers.

Indeed, more than eighty members of the House and Senate explained in their letter to the Bureau last summer regarding the study on which the proposed rule is based that:

the process that led to the Bureau’s Arbitration Study has not been fair, transparent, or comprehensive. The Bureau ignored requests from senior Members of Congress for basic information about the study preparation process. The Bureau also ignored requests to disclose the topics that would be covered by the study, and failed to provide the general public with any meaningful opportunities to provide input on the topics. Because the materials were kept behind closed doors, the final Arbitration Study included entire sections that were not included in the preliminary report that was provided to the public.

As a result, the flawed process produced a fatally-flawed study. Rather than focusing on the critical question—whether regulating or prohibiting arbitration will benefit consumers—and devising a plan to address the issues relevant to resolving that question, the Bureau failed to provide even the most basic of comparisons needed to evaluate the use of arbitration agreements.<sup>8</sup>

Two prominent academics recently conducted an independent analysis of the CFPB’s study, concluding that it “provides no foundation for imposing new restrictions or prohibitions on mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts.”<sup>9</sup> In particular, the study “fail[s] to support any conclusion that arbitration clauses in consumer credit contracts reduce consumer welfare or that encouraging more class

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<sup>8</sup> <http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/files/2015/06/McHenry-Scott-to-Cordray-Letter-re-Arbitration.pdf>

<sup>9</sup> Jason Scott Johnston & Todd Zywicki, *The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Arbitration Study: A Summary and Critique* 5 (Mercatus Ctr., George Mason Univ., Working Paper, Aug. 2015), available at [http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working\\_papers/LS1507.pdf](http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/LS1507.pdf).



action litigation would be beneficial to consumers and the economy.”<sup>10</sup> The CFPB’s recent notice of proposed rulemaking offers no response to these scholar’s extensive critique.

The study’s flaws—and the tremendous amount of evidence ignored by the Bureau—are discussed in detail in the attached appendix.

### ***What is Arbitration and how does it Work?***

Everyone knows how courts are supposed to work. Who hasn’t watched *Law and Order* or *The Good Wife* or dozens of other television shows? Between television and high school civics, we have the impression that courts are places where people can, and do, receive justice. (As discussed below, that impression is far removed from the current reality of the court system.)<sup>11</sup>

Arbitration seems more mysterious. But we’ve seen arbitration in operation too.

*The People’s Court* isn’t a court; it is arbitration, with Judge Wapner, and now Judge Milian, as the arbitrator. *Judge Judy* also resolves disputes as an arbitrator.<sup>12</sup>

Their common-sense approach is just how consumer arbitration works—the parties come in, present their cases informally, and the arbitrator rules. No complex procedures; a lawyer is not necessary (although lawyers can be used); and there is no obligation to take days off from work or family obligations to sit through lengthy proceedings and postponements—losing pay, while seeking justice—which court cases require.

And the process can even be simpler than the in-person hearings on TV. Arbitration employs web-based technology that allows claims to be filed and prosecuted online or with a telephonic hearing, at the consumer’s option.

The American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), for example, requires the business to bear most arbitration costs; many companies pay even the consumer’s

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<sup>10</sup> *Id.* at 6.

<sup>11</sup> See discussion beginning on Pg. 18.

<sup>12</sup> See *Kabia v. Koch*, 713 N.Y.S.2d 250, 253-55 (Civ. Ct. 2000) (holding that “The People’s Court” was an arbitration under New York law and noting that “Judge Judy” used a “similar” arbitration agreement).

share, which the AAA caps at \$200.<sup>13</sup> The AAA offers hearings by telephone, and participants can file documents and otherwise communicate with the AAA and arbitrator through email.

And arbitration is fair—studies show that consumers and employees who use this efficient dispute-resolution system prevail in arbitration at least as frequently as, and often more frequently than, they do in court:

- A recent study by scholars Christopher Drahozal and Samantha Zyontz of claims filed with the AAA found that consumers win relief 53.3% of the time.<sup>14</sup> By contrast, empirical studies that have sampled wide ranges of claims have similarly reported that plaintiffs win in state and federal court approximately 50% of the time.<sup>15</sup>
  - Drahozal and Zyontz found that “the consumer claimant[s] won some relief against the business more than half of the time,” and were generally awarded between 42% and 73% of the amount they claimed, depending on the size of the claim and how average recoveries were calculated (mean or median). The authors found little evidence for a purported “repeat player” effect. Consumers prevailed more than half the time against repeat and non-repeat businesses alike; prevailing claimants were “awarded on average an almost identical percent of the amount claimed” (approximately 52%). The authors concluded that any discrepancy could be explained by businesses becoming better at screening cases ahead of time to “settle meritorious claims and arbitrate only weaker claims.”<sup>16</sup>
- A study of 186 claimants who pursued employment arbitration in the securities industry concluded that employees who arbitrate were more likely to win their disputes than employees who litigate in federal court. The study found that 46% of those who arbitrated won, as compared to only 34% in litigation; the median monetary award in arbitration was higher; only 3.8% of the litigated

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<sup>13</sup> AAA, *Costs of Arbitration*, <https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTAGE2026862>.

<sup>14</sup> Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, *An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer Arbitrations*, 25 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 843, 896-904 (2010).

<sup>15</sup> See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., *Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal Courts: A Statistical Portrait*, 19 Seattle U. L. Rev. 433, 437 (1996) (observing that in 1991-92, plaintiffs won 51% of jury trials in state court and 56% of jury trials in federal court, while in 1979-1993 plaintiffs won 50% of jury trials).

<sup>16</sup> Drahozal & Zyontz, 25 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. at 898, 912-13.

cases studied ever reached a jury trial; and the arbitrations were resolved 33% faster than in court.<sup>17</sup>

- One study of 200 AAA employment awards concluded that low-income employees brought 43.5% of arbitration claims, most of which were low-value enough that the employees would not have been able to find an attorney willing to bring litigation on their behalf. These employees were often able to pursue their arbitrations without an attorney, and won at the same rate as individuals with representation.<sup>18</sup>
- A later study of 261 AAA employment awards from the same period found that for higher-income employees, win rates in like cases in arbitration and litigation were essentially equal, as were median damages. The study attempted to compare “apples” to “apples” by considering separately cases that involved and those that did not involve discrimination claims. With respect to discrimination and non-discrimination claims alike, the study found no statistically significant difference in the success rates of higher-income employees in arbitration and in litigation. For lower-income employees, the study did not attempt to draw comparisons between results in arbitration and in litigation, because lower-income employees appeared to lack meaningful access to the courts—and therefore could not bring a sufficient volume of court cases to provide a baseline for comparison.<sup>19</sup>
- Another study of arbitration of employment-discrimination claims concluded that arbitration is “substantially fair to employees, including those employees at the lower end of the income scale,” with employees enjoying a win rate comparable to the win rate for employees proceeding in federal court.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, *An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Where do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights?*, 58 Disp. Resol. J. 56, 58 (Nov. 2003 - Jan. 2004).

<sup>18</sup> Elizabeth Hill, *Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association*, 18 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 777, 785-88 (2003) (summarizing results of past studies by Lisa Bingham that lacked empirical evidence proving the existence of an alleged “repeat player” and “repeat arbitrator” effect).

<sup>19</sup> See Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, *Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison*, 58 Disp. Resol. J. 44, 45, 47-50 (Nov. 2003-Jan. 2004).

<sup>20</sup> See Elizabeth Hill, *AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost*, 58 Disp. Resol. J. 9, 13 (May/July 2003) (reporting employee win rate in arbitration of 43 percent); see also Eisenberg & Hill, 58 Disp. Resol. J. at 48 tbl. 1 (reporting employee win rate in federal district court during the same time period was 36.4 percent).

- In 2004, the National Workrights Institute compiled all available employment-arbitration studies and concluded that employees were almost 20% more likely to win in arbitration than in litigated employment cases. It also concluded that in almost half of employment arbitrations, employees were seeking redress for claims too small to support cost-effective litigation. Median awards received by plaintiffs were the same as in court, although the distorting effect of occasional large jury awards resulted in higher average recoveries in litigation.<sup>21</sup>
  
- Critics of arbitration sometimes point to a now-discredited report from the advocacy group Public Citizen<sup>22</sup> as purported support for the assertion that arbitration is unfair. That report shows the folly of examining outcomes in arbitration without comparing them to analogous outcomes in court.
  - Public Citizen examined data about claims brought by creditors against consumer debtors and concluded from a high win rate for creditors that arbitration is biased. In those cases, however, the consumer often does not appear and does not contest the claim and is therefore liable either because he has defaulted or “because he owes the debt.”<sup>23</sup>
  
  - A more rigorous empirical study showed that “consumers fare better” in debt-collection arbitrations than in court: “creditors won some relief before the AAA in 77.8 percent of individual AAA debt collection arbitrations and either 64.1 percent or 85.2 percent of the AAA debt collection program arbitrations,” depending on how the research parameters were defined. By contrast, in contested court cases creditors won relief against consumers between 80% and 100% of the time, depending on the court.<sup>24</sup>

As one study published in the *Stanford Law Review* explained in surveying the empirical research, “[w]hat seems clear from the results of these studies is that the

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<sup>21</sup> National Workrights Institute, *Employment Arbitration: What Does the Data Show?* (2004),

[https://web.archive.org/web/20090423052708/http://www.workrights.org/current/cd\\_arbitration.html](https://web.archive.org/web/20090423052708/http://www.workrights.org/current/cd_arbitration.html).

<sup>22</sup> Public Citizen, *The Arbitration Trap*, Sept. 2007, <http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf>.

<sup>23</sup> Sarah Rudolph Cole & Theodore H. Frank, *The Current State of Consumer Arbitration*, 15 *Disp. Resol. Mag.* 30, 31 (Fall 2008).

<sup>24</sup> Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, *Creditor Claims in Arbitration and in Court*, 7 *Hastings Bus. L.J.* 77, 91, 97, 111-16 (Winter 2011).

assertions of many arbitration critics were either overstated or simply wrong.”<sup>25</sup> There simply is no empirical support for the contention that arbitration leads to unfair or subpar outcomes when compared with litigation in our overcrowded court system. Rather, the overwhelming weight of the available evidence establishes that arbitration allows consumers and employees to obtain redress faster, cheaper, and more effectively than they could in court.

Arbitration also has built-in fairness guarantees. The rules of arbitration organizations along with existing law protect consumers and employees against unfair procedures and biased arbitrators.

Thus, when courts find arbitration provisions unfair to consumers or employees under generally applicable principles, they do not hesitate to invalidate the agreements. For example, courts have repeatedly invalidated provisions of arbitration agreements that purported to impose:

- excessive costs and fees to the consumer or employee for accessing the arbitral forum;<sup>26</sup>
- limits on damages that can be awarded by an arbitrator when such damages would be available to an individual consumer or employee in court;<sup>27</sup>
- requirements that arbitration take place in inconvenient locations;<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> David Sherwyn et al., *Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research*, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1557, 1567 (2005) (emphasis added).

<sup>26</sup> The Supreme Court has held that a party to an arbitration agreement may challenge enforcement of the agreement if the claimant would be required to pay excessive filing fees or arbitrator fees in order to arbitrate a claim. See *Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph*, 531 U.S. 79, 90-92 (2000). Since *Randolph*, courts have aggressively protected consumers and employees who show that they would be forced to bear excessive costs to access the arbitral forum. See, e.g., *Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co.*, 733 F.3d 916, 923-25 (9th Cir. 2013) (refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement that required the employee to pay an unrecoverable portion of the arbitrator’s fees “regardless of the merits of the claim”); *Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.*, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310-11 (2013) (reaffirming that a challenge to an arbitration agreement might be successful if “filing and administrative fees attached to arbitration . . . are so high as to make access to the forum impracticable” for a plaintiff). Courts also have reached the same conclusion under state unconscionability law. See, e.g., *Brunke v. Ohio State Home Servs., Inc.*, 2008 WL 4615578 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2008); *Liebrand v. Brinker Rest. Corp.*, 2008 WL 2445544 (Cal. Ct. App. June 18, 2008); *Murphy v. Mid-West Nat’l Life Ins. Co. of Tenn.*, 78 P.3d 766 (Idaho 2003).

<sup>27</sup> See, e.g., *Venture Cotton Coop. v. Freeman*, 395 S.W.3d 272 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013) (limit on damages and attorney’s fees under state consumer protection law); *Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Abner*, 260 S.W.3d 351, 352, 355 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (limited to “actual and direct” damages); see also *Carll v. Terminix Int’l Co.*, 793 A.2d 921 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (limit on damages for personal injury); *Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P.*, 341 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2003) (limit on punitive damages); *Woebse v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am.*, 977 So. 2d 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (limit on punitive damages); cf. *Am. Express Co.*, 133 S. Ct. at 2310 (explaining that federal law would require invalidating “a provision in an arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion of certain [federal] statutory rights”).

- biased procedures for selecting the arbitrator;<sup>29</sup>
- unreasonably shortened statutes of limitations;<sup>30</sup> and
- “loser pays” provisions under which a consumer or employee might have to pay the full costs of the arbitration,<sup>31</sup> or must pay the drafting party’s costs regardless of who wins.<sup>32</sup>

Of course, the vast majority of arbitration agreements do not exhibit these sorts of defects; and the clear trend has been for companies to make arbitration provisions ever more favorable to their customers and employees. But, when courts find that overreaching occurs, they have not hesitated to strike down the offending provision.

In addition to the courts’ oversight of arbitration provisions, the leading arbitration forums provide additional fairness protections. The AAA and JAMS—the nation’s leading arbitration service providers—recognize that independence, due

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<sup>28</sup> See, e.g., *Willis v. Nationwide Debt Settlement Grp.*, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (D. Or. 2012) (travel from Oregon to California); *College Park Pentecostal Holiness Church v. Gen. Steel Corp.*, 847 F. Supp. 2d 807 (D. Md. 2012) (travel from Maryland to Colorado); *Hollins v. Debt Relief of Am.*, 479 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (D. Neb. 2007) (travel from Nebraska to Texas); *Philyaw v. Platinum Enters., Inc.*, 54 Va. Cir. 364 (Va. Cir. Ct. Spotsylvania Cnty. 2001) (travel from Virginia to Los Angeles); see also, e.g., *Dominguez v. Finish Line, Inc.*, 439 F. Supp. 2d 688 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (travel from Texas to Indiana); *Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc.*, 128 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (travel from Missouri to Arkansas); *Pinedo v. Premium Tobacco Stores, Inc.*, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 435 (Ct. App. 2000) (travel from Los Angeles to Oakland).

<sup>29</sup> See, e.g., *Chavarria*, 733 F.3d at 923-25 (holding that an arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable when it “would always produce an arbitrator proposed by [the company] in employee-initiated arbitration[s],” and barred selection of “institutional arbitration administrators”); see also, e.g., *Murray v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union*, 289 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 2002) (striking down an arbitration agreement that gave the employer the sole right to create a list of arbitrators from whom the employee could then pick); *Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips*, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999); *Newton v. American Debt Services, Inc.*, 854 F. Supp. 2d 712, 726 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (refusing to enforce a provision that would have granted a company sole discretion to choose an “independent and qualified” arbitrator for its consumer disputes because, under the circumstances, there was no guarantee that the arbitrator would be neutral); *Roberts v. Time Plus Payroll Servs., Inc.*, 2008 WL 376288 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2008) (refusing to enforce provision that would have given employer sole discretion to select arbitrator, and instead requiring parties to select arbitrator jointly); *Missouri ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider*, 194 S.W.3d 853 (Mo. 2006) (invalidating provision giving president of a local home-builder association sole discretion to pick arbitrator for disputes between local home-builders and home buyers).

<sup>30</sup> See, e.g., *Zaborowski v. MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc.*, 2013 WL 1363568 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2013); *Adler v. Fred Lind Manor*, 103 P.3d 773 (Wash. 2004) (180 days); see also *Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enters., Inc.*, 293 P.3d 1197 (Wash. 2013) (refusing to enforce arbitration agreement in debt-collection contract that required debtor to present claim within 30 days after dispute arose); *Alexander*, 341 F.3d at 256 (same, for an employee); *Stirlen*, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 138 (rejecting provision that imposed shortened one-year statute of limitations).

<sup>31</sup> See *Gandee*, 293 P.3d at 1197; *Alexander*, 341 F.3d at 256; *Sosa v. Paulos*, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996).

<sup>32</sup> See, e.g., *In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig.*, MDL No. 2036, 485 F. App’x 403 (11th Cir. 2012); see also *Samaniego v. Empire Today LLC*, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (attorneys’ fees).

process, and reasonable costs to consumers are vital elements of a fair and accessible arbitration system. They, therefore, adhere to standards that establish basic requirements of fairness that provide strong protections for consumers and employees—and refuse to administer arbitrations unless the operative clause is consistent with those standards.

### *Arbitration’s Benefits to Consumers*

This fair, efficient arbitration system benefits consumers in multiple ways.

**First**, particularly in the consumer context, arbitration empowers injured parties by freeing them from dependence on lawyers—consumers can seek and obtain redress for the many claims for which a lawyer is too expensive or that lawyers are unwilling or unable to take on. Indeed, one study reported that a claim must be worth at least \$60,000; in some markets, this threshold may be as high as \$200,000.<sup>33</sup> Plaintiffs who brave the court system find that a hearing on their claims is long delayed by overcrowded dockets in our underfunded courts.<sup>34</sup>

Most injuries that consumers suffer are small and individualized—excess charges on a bill, a defective piece of merchandise, and the like. These claims are too small to justify paying a lawyer to handle the matter; in any event, most consumers do not have the resources to do so. And, because they are individualized, they cannot be asserted in class actions because the governing standard (embodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23) requires that common issues predominate for a class to be certified. As Justice Breyer has recognized—in a decision joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg—“the typical consumer who has only a small damages claim (who seeks, say, the value of only a defective refrigerator or television set)” would be

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<sup>33</sup> Elizabeth Hill, *Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association*, 18 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 777, 783 (2003); Recommendations of the Minnesota Supreme Court Civil Justice Reform Task Force 10 (Nov. 23, 2011), <http://www.mnbar.org/sections/outstate-practice/11-23-11%20Civil%20Justice%-20Reform.pdf>.

<sup>34</sup> In California, for example, repeated budget cuts have forced 52 courthouses and 202 courtrooms to close, prompting the state judiciary to warn that funding for the state’s courts is no longer “enough to sustain a healthy [judicial system].” Judicial Council of Cal., *InFocus: Judicial Branch Budget Crisis*, available at <http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/courtsbudget.htm>. Los Angeles County, the state’s largest, reported this year that its remaining courts are facing “unmanageably high” workloads, which is producing “intolerable delay” in civil cases. Judicial Council of Cal., *2015 Budget Snapshot: County of Los Angeles* (Feb. 2015), available at [http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/-documents/County\\_Budget\\_Snapshot\\_Combined\\_2015.pdf](http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/-documents/County_Budget_Snapshot_Combined_2015.pdf).

left “without any remedy but a court remedy, the costs and delays of which could eat up the value of an eventual small recovery.”<sup>35</sup>

Opponents of arbitration point to small claims court; but, that is not a viable alternative. State budget cuts have severely hobbled these courts and repeated adjournments of cases, together with elimination of night sessions and some court sessions altogether, require individuals to take off multiple days from work or family obligations—often imposing costs greater than the amount at issue.<sup>36</sup>

Critics of arbitration sometimes express skepticism about arbitration’s benefits because there are relatively few consumer financial arbitrations. That analysis is wrong for several reasons. To begin with, the actual numbers aren’t clear. Most analyses look only at consumer arbitrations formally commenced before the American Arbitration Association, but there are other organizations providing this service.

Also, the attacks on arbitration take a toll, discouraging consumers from using it. Where arbitration has been supported and allowed to develop—under the auspices of the Kaiser Foundation health plan<sup>37</sup>, for example, or in the employment context<sup>38</sup>—it has been used with great frequency and success by claimants.

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<sup>35</sup> *Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson*, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995). Professor Peter Rutledge has observed that, without access to arbitration, consumers would be “far worse off, for they would find it far harder to obtain a lawyer, find the cost of dispute resolution far more expensive, wait far longer to obtain relief and may well never see a day in court.” Peter B. Rutledge, *Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act*, 9 *Cardozo J. Conflict Resolution* 267, 267 (2008).

<sup>36</sup> See, e.g., Brian Lawson, *Proposed budget cuts for Alabama courts ‘crazy, devastating’*, AL.com (May 5, 2015), available at [http://www.al.com/news/huntsville/index.ssf/2015/05/proposed\\_cuts\\_for\\_alabama\\_cour.html](http://www.al.com/news/huntsville/index.ssf/2015/05/proposed_cuts_for_alabama_cour.html) (quoting Alabama’s administrative director of courts as saying that as a result of proposed cuts to state courts, “Small claims courts . . . those dockets will be heavily decreased or suspended for who knows how long.”); Marisa Lagos, *Cutbacks Still Felt Deeply In California’s Civil Courts*, KQED (Mar. 11, 2015), available at <http://ww2.kqed.org/news/2015/03/12/-court-budget-cuts-delay-justice> (“L.A. made 10 percent across-the-board cuts to court services in 2012, but it wasn’t enough. So the next year, they made further cuts. In all, 79 courtrooms were shuttered, limiting where people can contest traffic tickets or adjudicate small claims cases.”);

N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Assoc., Task Force on Judicial Budget Cuts, *Courts in Crisis* 7 (Jan. 3, 2014), [http://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications1666\\_0.pdf](http://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications1666_0.pdf) (“[S]evere reduction in evening hours in Small Claims Court from four nights a week to one night in most boroughs [of New York City] and to only one or two nights a month in Richmond County makes the Small Claims Court basically unavailable to claimants who cannot take time off during the day to appear. In Brooklyn and Manhattan, it may now take up to several years to get a judgment.”).

<sup>37</sup> Annual Report of the Office of the Independent Administrator of the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. Mandatory Arbitration System for Disputes with Health Plan Members, January 1, 2014 – December 31, 2014 at 44, <http://www.oia-kaiserarb.com/pdfs/2014-Annual-Report.pdf> (reporting that almost 50% of the parties and attorneys who went through Kaiser arbitrations that year reported that the arbitration system was better than going to court, another 38% reported that it was the same as going to court—and only 14% reported it was worse).



Most importantly, virtually all arbitration programs have a pre-filing settlement process and the overwhelming majority of disputes are resolved before arbitration; because, the availability of arbitration gives individuals leverage to pressure companies to settle. If an individual's only threat is to "go to court," a company could refuse to settle, knowing that the judicial system is an unrealistic option for consumers because it is too expensive and difficult to navigate. These pre-filing processes do not show up in the AAA's statistics, but they generate hundreds of millions of dollars in relief for consumers—all of which was totally ignored by the CFPB, even though the agency was repeatedly asked to examine this benefit.

**Second**, companies increasingly are adopting consumer-friendly arbitration agreements that give consumers rights that are greater than those available in court. As the Solicitor General of the United States explained in its briefing before the Supreme Court in *American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant*, "many companies have modified their agreements to include streamlined procedures and premiums designed to encourage customers to bring claims."<sup>39</sup> The government recognized that consumer-friendly clauses ensure that instances where individuals cannot bring their claims "remain rare." As the brief explained:

AT&T Mobility modified its arbitration agreement during the course of the litigation to include cost- and fee-shifting provisions and premiums designed to ensure that **customers could bring low-value claims on an individual basis**. These modifications left consumers **'better off under their arbitration agreement' than they would have been in class litigation**. And by obviating a potential objection to enforcement of the arbitration agreement, those modifications simultaneously served the company's interest in avoiding litigation.

That provision, for example, provided for "bounty payments" as an incentive for an individual to bring a claim in arbitration, and agreed not only to pay any attorney's fees that would be authorized by the underlying law, but double the

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<sup>38</sup> See, e.g., Elizabeth Hill, *Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association*, 18 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 777, 824 (2003) (empirical study concluding that "AAA employment arbitration offers affordable, substantial, measurable due process to employees").

<sup>39</sup> Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 28-29, *American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant*, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (No. 12-133), 2013 WL 367051 (emphasis added).

attorney's fees if the arbitrator awards more than the company's last pre-hearing settlement offer.

**Third**, consumers and employees also benefit through the systematic reduction of litigation-related transaction costs, which leads to lower prices for products and services and higher wages.

How does this work? Businesses face many costs in bringing products and services to market. On top of the ordinary costs of running a business, they must absorb costs of litigating business-related claims. The transaction costs of litigation are high; they include settlements, judgments resolving meritorious claims, and the costs of defending against *all* lawsuits. Because those transaction costs are lower in arbitration, businesses can reduce costs that otherwise inflate product and service prices and reduce the availability of margins that could pay for wage increases.

The CFPB's study tried to provide that businesses do not pass on cost savings from arbitration to consumers and employees, but that attempt was unpersuasive: as the academics who reviewed the CFPB's study concluded, the CFPB's findings on this point were plagued by "theoretical problems" and "technical failures," and they fly in the face of "[b]asic economic theory," which "predicts that competition forces firms to pass on to consumers [or employees] at least a portion of any cost decrease."<sup>40</sup>

These are all significant benefits for consumers that will be eliminated by the Bureau's proposed rule. The Bureau's rule can only make sense, therefore, if the benefits to consumers from class actions significantly outweigh the benefits from arbitration that the rule would eliminate. That is not at all the case.

### ***The Reality of Class Actions***

Class actions in the federal court system turn fifty years old in 2016. That should be the occasion for a realistic assessment of the pluses and minuses of what in 1966 was a dramatic innovation in the law. Instead, class action proponents portray them as an unalloyed good, and some opponents say they are utterly worthless in both theory and practice.

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<sup>40</sup> See Johnston & Zywicki, *supra* note 9, at 33-34.

Proponents of class actions argue that the process allows individuals to band together to obtain redress for injuries that are too small to litigate on their own. The class procedure, the theory goes, provides a route to vindicate claims too small to justify an individual lawsuit and allows courts to resolve claims efficiently.

Unfortunately, the reality of class actions today does not come close to fulfilling that promise.

Study after study confirms this fact:

- The CFPB's own review of class actions found that 87% provide **no** benefits to class members; the remaining class actions were settled, but the Bureau's data indicates that on average only 4% of class members obtained monetary relief—meaning that 96% got nothing. And, the data indicate that the average payment to a class member was \$32.35. Plaintiffs' lawyers, on the other hand, received an average of \$1 million per case.<sup>41</sup>
- A recent study of class action data by a professor at Emory Law School found that, although the pre-distribution description of settlements allocated 60% to the class and 37.9% to class members, the likely actual distribution of funds in many settlements resulted in only 9% of the funds going to class members.<sup>42</sup>
- A new empirical study by Professor Jason Johnston of the University of Virginia Law School determined that 60-80% of filed class actions end with no payment to the class (depending on the type of claim); attorneys' fees therefore often amounted to 300-400% of the amount actually paid to class members.<sup>43</sup>
- A study by my law firm found that two-thirds of resolved cases provided no benefit to class members; the remaining cases were settled, but the available data showed that a miniscule percentage of class members

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<sup>41</sup> See pages 4-5 of the Appendix to this testimony.

<sup>42</sup> Joanna Shepherd, *An Empirical Survey of No-Injury Class Actions* (2016), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2726905>.

<sup>43</sup> Jason Scott Johnston, *High Cost, Little Compensation, no Harm to Deter: New Evidence on Class Actions under Federal Consumer Protection Statutes* (2016), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2777618>.

obtained payments—the maximum was 12% and for most of the settlements less than 2% of the class.<sup>44</sup>

Note that these cases are virtually never litigated to a final merits determination. If the motion to dismiss is denied and a class is certified, the case is inevitably settled—meaning some number of meritless cases are ending in substantial payments (most of which go to the lawyers), because the larger downside risk of a loss and the cost of litigation leads defendants to settle even when they might win in the end.

Moreover, class actions are often marked by abusive behavior. Press reports and court decisions document abusive behavior by plaintiffs’ lawyers, including possible under-the-table payments to convince individuals to serve as representative plaintiffs<sup>45</sup>; use of payments to charities (termed “cy pres”) to inflate the size of settlements in order to justify large fees to plaintiffs’ attorneys<sup>46</sup>; the use of relatives, employees, or other related parties to serve as class representatives who will do the bidding of the plaintiffs’ lawyers<sup>47</sup> agreeing to settlements that provide class members with mere coupons or vouchers while guaranteeing the plaintiffs’ lawyers hefty fees<sup>48</sup>;

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<sup>44</sup> Mayer Brown LLP, *Do Class Actions Benefit Class Members?* (Dec. 2013), available at <https://www-mayerbrown.com/files/uploads/Documents/PDFs/2013/December/DoClassActionsBenefitClassMembers.pdf>

<sup>45</sup> See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, *Collapse Of 5-Hour Energy Case Reveals The Secrets Of Class Action Lawyers*, *Forbes* (Nov., 17, 2015), available at <http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/11/17/collapse-of-5-hour-energy-case-reveals-secrets/#9c14b4b1aa40>; *Swift v. First USA Bank*, 1999 WL 1212561, at \*6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 1999) (refusing to certify class because plaintiffs’ attorneys had initially agreed to pay lead plaintiff’s husband a portion of their attorneys’ fees as a “finder’s fee”); had been Press Release, United States Dep’t of Justice, Milberg Weiss Law Firm, Two Senior Partners Indicted in Secret Kickback Scheme Involving Named Plaintiffs in Class-Action Lawsuits (May 18, 2006), available at <http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/milbergpress05182006.pdf> (announcing 20-count indictment against Milberg Weiss and two of its senior partners).

<sup>46</sup> See *Marek v. Lane*, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (noting the many “fundamental concerns surrounding the use of [cy pres] remedies in class action litigation”); *In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig.*, 708 F.3d 163, 175 (3d Cir. 2013) (vacating order approving settlement that would have given just \$3 million to class members and \$18.5 million to cy pres recipients, while awarding plaintiffs’ attorneys \$14 million in fees); Alison Frankel, *When class money doesn’t go to class members: new calls for SCOTUS review*, *Reuters* (Dec. 14, 2015), available at <http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/12/14/when-class-money-doesnt-go-to-class-members-new-calls-for-scotus-review/>.

<sup>47</sup> See, e.g., *Eubank v. Pella Corp.*, 753 F.3d 718, 722, 724 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.) (holding that settlement should have been disapproved, in part because the lead named plaintiff was the father-in-law of the lead plaintiffs’ attorney—which created a “grave conflict of interest” and “palpable” “impropriety”); *Apple Computer, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 126 Cal. App. 4th 1253, 1262 (2005) (disqualifying two law firms from serving as class counsel in a class action because the named plaintiff was a lawyer at one of the firms and because during a two-year period, the two firms had jointly filed ten class actions in which “an attorney from [one firm] or a relative of one of the attorneys was the named plaintiff”).

<sup>48</sup> See, e.g., *Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC*, 717 F. Supp. 2d 37, 46-48 (D.D.C. 2010) (class received vouchers toward future conferences put on by defendant; attorneys received nearly \$1.5 million in fees); *Bachman v. A.G. Edwards, Inc.*, 344 S.W.3d 260, 264-65 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (class received vouchers toward brokerage fees charged by defendant; attorneys received \$21 million).

and “clear sailing” agreements in which defendants agree not to challenge the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ fee requests—likely because the plaintiffs’ lawyers have “bargain[ed] away something of value to the plaintiff class,” their supposed clients.<sup>49</sup>

One outspoken critic of arbitration—the *New York Times*—has devoted considerable space recently to attacking arbitration. Those stories are not only inaccurate on their own terms,<sup>50</sup> but also are particularly troubling because they simply assume the benefits of class actions without examining whether consumers actually realize any of those benefits.

But another *Times* reporter did take the time to examine a consumer class action and provided a case study of the abuse that is all too commonplace.<sup>51</sup>

The story examined a class action against Netflix and Walmart alleging violations of the antitrust laws. Prior to 2005, the two companies had been competitors in the DVD rental market. That year, they reached an agreement under which Walmart would stop renting DVDs and Netflix would stop selling them—in effect ending competition between the two in the DVD sales and rental markets. The plaintiffs who brought the class action alleged that the deal violated the antitrust laws because it was anticompetitive and inflated the price of Netflix subscriptions.

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<sup>49</sup> See, e.g., *Malchman v. Davis*, 761 F.2d 893, 908 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., concurring).

<sup>50</sup> The *Times* stories were criticized by, among others, Yale Law Professor Stephen Carter, Forbes’ columnist Daniel Fisher, and legal expert Walter Olson. See Stephen Carter, *Arbitration is Everywhere and Not All Bad*, Bloomberg View (Nov. 3, 2015), available at <http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-11-03/arbitration-is-everywhere-and-not-all-bad>; Daniel Fisher, New York Times “Expose” of Arbitration Clauses Leaves Lawyers in the Shadows, Forbes (Nov. 1, 2015), available at <http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/11/01/new-york-times-expose-of-arbitration-clauses-leaves-lawyers-in-the-shadows/#510700466665>; Walter Olson, New York Times Assails Arbitration, Cato at Liberty (Nov. 2, 2015), available at <http://www.cato.org/blog/new-york-times-assails-arbitration>. The stories’ inaccuracies are detailed in several in-depth analyses by the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform. See *Dog Bites Man: New York Times Prefers Lawyer-Controlled Class Actions over Fair Arbitration that Enables Individuals to Protect Themselves* (Nov. 2, 2015), available at <http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/-dog-bites-man-new-york-times-prefers-lawyer-controlled-class-actions-over-fair-arbitration-that-enables-individuals-to-protect-themselves>; *New York Times Part 2: Arbitration Responsible for All of the World’s Ills (Well, Just About All)* (Nov. 4, 2015), available at <http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/new-york-times-part-2-arbitration-responsible-for-all-of-the-worlds-ills-well-just-about-all>; *The New York Times Doesn’t Like Arbitration, But It Really Likes Plaintiffs’ Lawyers* (Jan. 7, 2016), available at <http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/the-new-york-times-doesnt-like-arbitration-but-it-really-likes-plaintiffs-lawyers>.

<sup>51</sup> David Segal, A Little Walmart Gift Card for You, a Big Payout for Lawyers, N.Y. Times (Jan. 30, 2016), available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/31/your-money/a-little-walmart-gift-card-for-you-a-big-payout-for-lawyers.html?ref=business&r=0>.

Netflix fought the class action (and won on summary judgment); Walmart chose to settle. The headline touted by the plaintiffs' lawyers: "\$27 million settlement." But the details tell the real story.

Members of the class were entitled to choose between receiving a check for approximately \$12 or a Walmart gift card for the same amount.

And the lawyers? They got fees of \$6.8 million and expenses of \$1.7 million for a total of \$8.5 million.

A settlement in which lawyers got \$8.5 million for providing \$14 million in \$12 increments would be troubling by itself. But the \$14 million figure itself is an overstatement unless *all* of the gift cards were cashed. And, as the *Times* explained, "[w]e don't know" how many were cashed: "That information has not been publicly revealed." But, common sense suggests that many class members didn't use the gift cards.

Ted Frank, a critic of class-action settlements that favor lawyers over consumers, explained that gift cards were employed "to maximize the illusion of relief"—so that the lawyers' fee could be justified on the dollar amount of issued gift cards, not the dollar amount actually used by consumers.

Congress addressed this precise problem in the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, targeting "coupon settlements" in which class members received a credit toward purchases of the defendant's products and the plaintiff lawyers' fee was based on the gross amount of coupons and therefore had no relationship to the real benefit to the class. The law says that plaintiffs' lawyers must be paid based on the value of the coupons *actually redeemed*, not the value of all the coupons made available by the defendant.

The *Times* also explained that this case is "positively pro-consumer compared with others"—for example, another case (on appeal) in which the settlement provided

\$6 million for charity, \$5.7 million for plaintiffs' lawyers and a mere \$345,000 for consumers. (The case is under appeal, so no one has been paid yet.) The reason the consumer side is so meager is that **less than 1 percent** of the 7.2 million class members actually submitted for

reimbursement. But the lawyers' fees were calculated based on the \$43 million that could have been disbursed if all eligible consumers had asked for a \$6 check.

As the *Times* consumer reporter put it, "Everybody won! O.K., not everybody."

The lack of real-world benefit to class members and other problems with class actions are not mere happenstance. They are a result of structural problems inherent in the current class action mechanism.

To begin with, many—probably a significant majority—of class actions today spring from the minds of lawyers, not from injured individuals. A *New York Times* profile<sup>52</sup> of one prominent plaintiffs' lawyer discussed the lawyer's "investigative team, which consists of three lawyers and a computer analyst. The group's job, to put it plainly, is to find ways to sue companies." The lawyers then find individuals who fit the claim. As Professor Martin Redish has noted, this confirms that "[t]he real parties in interest in... [many] class actions are... the plaintiffs' lawyers."<sup>53</sup>

Next, there is the problem that the interests of the class action lawyers and class members may not be aligned—as the *New York Times* story demonstrates. The lawyer's concern—at least in significant part—is on maximizing fees. That means finding claims that are easy to litigate, even if the particular "harm" alleged does not concern many, or even any, consumers.

There might be nothing wrong with that approach in theory—as long as there are effective checks to ensure that the lawyers' interest do not overwhelm the obligation to the (essentially absent and not-in-control) class members. Federal class action procedure assigns that role to the court, which must approve any settlement.

When both the defendant and plaintiffs' counsel are urging the court to approve the settlement as fair and reasonable, however, it is virtually impossible for the court to make an independent assessment of the underlying facts. The court's record is limited to what the parties put before it, and most overburdened judges are happy to see a settlement that removes a significant case from their docket. Certainly

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<sup>52</sup> Conor Dougherty, *Jay Edelson, the Class-Action Lawyer Who May Be Tech's Least Friendliest Man*, N.Y. Times (Apr. 4, 2015), available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/05/technology/unpopular-in-silicon-valley.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/05/technology/unpopular-in-silicon-valley.html?_r=1).

<sup>53</sup> Testimony of Martin H. Redish at 7, *Class Actions Seven Years After the Class Action Fairness Act* (June 1, 2012), available at <http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/Hearings%202012/-Redish%2006012012.pdf>.

defense counsel cannot be expected to take a position regarding the allocation of proceeds between class counsel and the class.

In recent years, class members objecting to settlements—represented by independent counsel—have begun participating in settlement proceedings and urging judges to disapprove settlements that favor class counsel over class members. The *New York Times* story reports an instance of this activity.

The problem, however, is that courts only have the power to disapprove settlements. That leaves the defendant in a meritless class action with two choices: expend huge resources litigating the case, or pay more to settle in order to obtain court approval. Neither result benefits consumers, who must pay the bill in either event. The court cannot take the step that often would be most logical when a proposed settlement is rejected: dismiss the action because the settlement terms proffered by the parties indicate that the case has little merit.

For all of these reasons, class actions provide little real-world benefit to consumers.

The CFPB, and other arbitration opponents, argue that even if class actions do a poor job of providing compensation to injured consumers, they nonetheless are justified because the threat of class-action liability deters companies from violating consumer laws. That is simply false.

The rationale for deterrence is the common-sense idea that a party will not engage in wrongdoing if it believes that it will incur costs for acting wrongfully that it will not incur if it complies with the law. If those costs are incurred without regard to the wrongfulness of the underlying conduct, there is no such deterrent effect.<sup>54</sup> That is the precise flaw in the private class action system.

As I have already discussed, plaintiffs' attorneys have little incentive to choose cases based on the merits of the underlying claims—the merits question will virtually never be reached, as the empirical data demonstrates. The plaintiffs' lawyer's goal, rather, is to find a claim for which the complaint can withstand a motion to dismiss

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<sup>54</sup> For an analogous discussion of how a failure to distinguish adequately between the culpable and the innocent dilutes the deterrent effect of sanctions in the criminal-law context, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, *The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law*, in 1 Handbook of Law and Economics 403, 427-29 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).



and that can satisfy the (legitimately) high hurdles for class certification—standards that do not embody an assessment of the underlying merit of the claim.

Because settlement inevitably follows once a class is certified, the class action’s burdens are not limited to businesses that engage in wrongful conduct. They are chiefly a function of whom plaintiffs’ lawyers choose to sue rather than who has engaged in actual wrongdoing. The threat of a class action therefore cannot—and does not—generally deter wrongful conduct.<sup>55</sup>

Businesses are far more likely to be deterred from wrongdoing by the reputational consequences of engaging in improper behavior, especially because reputational harm is often directly correlated to a business’s success or failure. Especially in an age of social media, consumer complaints can quickly go viral, impacting companies immediately and directly leading to changes in practices that garner consumer opposition. Class actions, by contrast, do nothing of the sort.

The CFPB’s preliminary analysis of the costs and benefits of its proposed rule assumes that class actions both compensate injured consumers and deter wrongful conduct. It, therefore, counted 100% of projected settlement value as a “benefit” to consumers—but in reality there is no basis for that conclusion. The benefits provided by class actions, if any, are much more limited.

***Eliminating Arbitration to Protect Class Actions: Bad for Consumers,  
Good for Lawyers***

Consumers deprived of arbitration would lose access to a means of securing justice that is cheaper and more accessible than court. The ability to vindicate wrongs that can’t practically be vindicated in court would disappear. And, those are the sorts of injuries that most consumers complain of. Few consumers are scouring disclosures or privacy policies to find technical violations of law that don’t impact their daily lives—that is what lawyers do.

Moreover, those individualized injuries are the types of harms that regulators don’t address because there is insufficient “impact” when regulatory resources are

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<sup>55</sup> Indeed, to the extent there is any effect associated with class actions, it is likely to deter both lawful and unlawful actions equally—requiring companies to take into account the risk of litigation costs without regard to the legality of the underlying action.

focused on a small injury unique to a consumer, even when the injury is very significant in that consumer's life.

And, there is no reason to believe that consumers would be unable to use arbitration to pursue small claims. Justice Kagan, writing an opinion for herself and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer in *American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant*, expressly pointed to several ways in which even small claims can be vindicated in arbitration without the use of class action procedures:

In this case,...the [arbitration] agreement could have prohibited class arbitration without offending the effective vindication rule *if* it had provided an alternative mechanism to share, shift or reduce the necessary costs. The agreement's problem is that it bars not just class actions, but also all mechanisms...for joinder or consolidation of claims, informal coordination among individual claimants, or amelioration of arbitral expenses.<sup>56</sup>

The arbitration provision that the Supreme Court viewed favorably in the *Concepcion* case contains both (i) incentive/bonus payments designed to encourage the pursuit of small claims, and (ii) the shifting of expert witness costs and attorneys' fees to defendants when the consumer or employee prevails on his or her claim. Specifically, if a consumer obtains an arbitral award that is greater than the company's last settlement offer, he or she will receive a minimum recovery of \$10,000 plus twice the amount of attorneys' fees that his or her counsel incurred for bringing the arbitration. In addition, the company is required to reimburse such a customer for reasonable expert witness fees.

Both of the lower courts in *Concepcion* found that the plaintiffs would be **better off under arbitration than in a class action** because they would be compensated more quickly and more completely.<sup>57</sup> As Justice Kagan explained in *American Express*, any concerns about whether individuals can vindicate their small claims in arbitration without the class-device are eliminated when an arbitration provision "provide[s] an alternative mechanism to.... shift...the necessary costs."<sup>58</sup> A significant number of companies have adopted similar provisions.

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<sup>56</sup> *Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.*, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2318 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting)

<sup>57</sup> *Concepcion*, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.

<sup>58</sup> *Am. Express*, 133 S. Ct. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

In addition, Justice Kagan stated that the concern about cost could be addressed through “*informal coordination among individual claimants*” to share the same lawyer, expert, and other elements required to prove the claim.<sup>59</sup> For example, an entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyer can recruit large numbers of clients (via the internet, social media, or other similar means), file thousands of individual arbitration demands on behalf of those clients, and distribute common costs over all those claimants, making the costs for expert witnesses and fact development very low on a per-claimant basis.

Given the low cost, efficiency, and fairness of arbitration, it is no surprise that some plaintiffs’ lawyers are already beginning to recognize that pursuing multiple individual arbitrations (or small-claims actions) is an economically viable business model—especially in view of the ability to reach multiple, similarly situated individuals using websites and social media.<sup>60</sup> Indeed, this strategy for spreading fixed litigation costs is an increasingly common means of pursuing disputes in arbitration.

Most importantly, the Bureau was created for the very purpose of addressing conduct that causes widespread consumer harms—the same types of claims that can be brought as class actions. Its claim of a lack of enforcement resources rings hollow in light of broad enforcement authority, broad supervision authority, and guaranteed funding. There, simply, is no need to rely on self-interested class action lawyers given the obvious flaws of the class action system and the benefits to consumers from arbitration.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee and look forward to answering your questions.

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<sup>59</sup> *Id.* (emphasis added). The dissent concluded that the American Express arbitration agreement prohibited such cost-sharing, but the majority disagreed, and American Express specifically conceded before the Supreme Court that costs could be shared in this manner. *See id.* at 2311 n.4 (majority).

<sup>60</sup> *See* Carolyn Whetzel & Jessie Kokrda Kamens, *Opt Out’s Use of Social Media Against Honda in Small Claims Win Possible “Game Changer,”* Bloomberg BNA Class Action Litig. Rep. (Feb. 10, 2012).

## Appendix

## APPENDIX

Arbitration is an important means of resolving disputes that provides significant benefits to consumers and businesses. As the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness (“CCMC”) and the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform (“ILR”) explained in detail in comments to the CFPB,<sup>1</sup> arbitration of consumer disputes has been common practice for decades; there are perhaps hundreds of millions of consumer contracts currently in force that include arbitration agreements—many of them relating to consumer financial products or services.

The Bureau’s study is deeply flawed in numerous respects:

- It ignores the practical benefits of arbitration as compared to the court system for vindicating the types of injuries that consumers most often suffer (pp. 1-3, below);
- It greatly exaggerates the supposed benefits of class actions (pp. 3-8);
- It ignores the significant role of government enforcement—particularly the CFPB’s own enforcement and supervision processes—in protecting consumers (pp. 8-9).
- It fails to consider the benefits that arbitration provides to injured parties in a variety of contexts—including in consumer arbitrations, when consumers are not discouraged by plaintiffs’ lawyers and others from invoking arbitration (pp. 9-14); and
- It wrongly denies the reduced transaction costs resulting from arbitration, which produce lower prices for consumers (pp. 14-18).

**A. *As the Bureau’s study of individual lawsuits confirms, for most injured consumers, the judicial system is not a realistic means for obtaining redress.***

Arbitration provides consumers, employees, and other injured parties with accessible and fair procedures for obtaining redress for claims that cannot be vindicated in court.

Many criticisms of arbitration are based on a flawed premise that the alternative system—litigation in court—gives individuals a meaningful and realistic option for resolving their disputes. That premise would make sense only if the judicial system were free of transaction costs, if every legitimate claimant could obtain legal representation, and if lawsuits were resolved expeditiously. But today’s judicial system falls far short of that ideal: litigation in court is costly and prone to intolerably long delays, and claimants often have difficulty finding a lawyer to take their case.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Letter from David Hirschmann & Lisa Rickard to Monica Jackson, *Re: Request for Information Regarding Scope, Methods, and Data Sources for Conducting Study of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements*, Docket No. CFPB-2012-0017, Supplemental Submission (Dec. 11, 2013), available at [http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/2013\\_12.11\\_CFPB\\_-\\_arbitration\\_cover\\_letter.pdf](http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/2013_12.11_CFPB_-_arbitration_cover_letter.pdf) (“*Chamber Comment II*”); Letter from David Hirschmann & Lisa Rickard to Monica Jackson, *Re: Request for Information Regarding Scope, Methods, and Data Sources for Conducting Study of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements*, Docket No. CFPB-2012-0017 (June 12, 2012), available at <http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2012-0017-0051> (“*Chamber Comment I*”).

<sup>2</sup> See *Chamber Comment II* at 6-9.

Most wrongs suffered by consumers are relatively small and individualized—excess charges on a bill, a defective piece of merchandise, and the like—and are simply too small to justify paying a lawyer to handle the matter. Such claims do not—and could not—attract lawyers willing to work on a contingency fee basis, because the claim promises no substantial recovery (and therefore no substantial legal fee).<sup>3</sup> And because these claims are individualized, they do not share the common factual basis required for a class action to be certified.

Even when a claim is large enough to justify paying an attorney's fees—or to attract a contingency-fee lawyer—the complexity of the litigation system makes litigation costly and inconvenient. In addition, every participant in the legal system faces a significant access-to-justice problem in our overcrowded and underfunded courts: docket backlogs have skyrocketed, courthouses have been closed due to budget cuts, and trials are delayed. In California, for example, repeated budget cuts have forced 52 courthouses and 202 courtrooms to close, prompting the state judiciary to warn that funding for the state's courts is no longer “enough to sustain a healthy [judicial system].”<sup>4</sup> Los Angeles County, the state's largest, reported this year that its remaining courts are facing “unmanageably high” workloads, which is producing “intolerable delay” in civil cases.<sup>5</sup>

As a result of these structural problems, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for individual consumers to litigate their claims in court as a practical matter. The Bureau's study results reflect this reality and demonstrate that litigation in court on an individual basis is not a realistic prospect for most people.

The Bureau examined individual (*i.e.*, non-class) cases brought in federal court by individual plaintiffs. Only in a miniscule percentage of the cases studied—5.6%—did plaintiffs pursue their claims *pro se*, confirming that litigation in court without the assistance of an attorney is infeasible for most consumers. The vast majority—90%—of federal-court individual cases the Bureau studied resulted in a known or potential settlement of the individual's claims. But the Bureau found very little data about the settlements; in the few cases where it did, the “amounts of the settlements ranged from \$250 to \$15,000.” Individual arbitration settlements and awards reflect similar or better successes: where data was available, “the average and median [debt] forbearance amounts were \$ 6,968 and \$4,900.”

Consumers obtained judgments in only 6.8% of the court cases studied, but most of those judgments involved a default judgment against the company. And for all the emphasis

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<sup>3</sup> One study reported that a claim must be worth at least \$60,000. Elizabeth Hill, *Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association*, 18 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 777, 783 (2003). In some markets, this threshold may be as high as \$200,000. Recommendations of the Minnesota Supreme Court Civil Justice Reform Task Force 10 (Nov. 23, 2011), <http://www.mnbar.org/sections/outstate-practice/11-23-11%20Civil%20Justice%20Reform.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup> Judicial Council of Cal., *InFocus: Judicial Branch Budget Crisis*, available at <http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/courtsbudget.htm>.

<sup>5</sup> Judicial Council of Cal., *2015 Budget Snapshot: County of Los Angeles* (Feb. 2015), available at [http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/County\\_Budget\\_Snapshot\\_Combined\\_2015.pdf](http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/County_Budget_Snapshot_Combined_2015.pdf).

that critics of arbitration place on the importance of a jury trial, only *one* judgment for a consumer “was the result of a trial.”<sup>6</sup>

The Bureau’s review of small claims courts—and “what use parties made of” these courts “with respect to consumer financial disputes”<sup>7</sup>—provides little reason to believe that consumers can effectively pursue relief in those forums, either. The Bureau undertook a limited examination of small claims court, cabining its review to “potential credit card cases involving a set of ten large credit card issuers.”<sup>8</sup> It appears that the Bureau simply counted the number of consumer credit card disputes, and did not address other categories of disputes that consumers may have. The report does not make a qualitative assessment of how small claims court operates in practice.

In fact, while small-claims courts were developed to make it easier for individuals to proceed without representation, they do not provide a realistic alternative because those courts are overcrowded and underfunded—as numerous media investigations have demonstrated.<sup>9</sup> For individuals unable to pursue their claims in arbitration, the outlook in small claims court is grim. The Bureau failed to assess the practical reality for these consumers.

**B. *The Bureau’s study paints an unjustifiably positive and one-sided picture of class actions, which provide virtually no benefits to the vast majority of consumers.***

The principal attack on arbitration—strongly touted by the plaintiffs’ bar—stems from the fact that arbitration agreements typically require that arbitration proceed on an individual basis and bar class procedures in arbitration and in court. This argument rests on a dubious assumption: that the elimination of class actions deprives consumers of a procedural mechanism that supposedly provides enormous benefits by allowing the vindication of small claims that (according to the argument) would be too expensive for plaintiffs to arbitrate individually. The Bureau’s proposal rests entirely on this argument, claiming that consumers are “significantly better protected from harm” when they are able to bring class action lawsuits and that class actions must be preserved.

But even the Bureau’s own gerrymandered study does not support this idealized view of the class action system. Although the language of the study report is carefully crafted to avoid criticizing class actions, the study’s underlying data actually establish that class actions are, on the whole, not effective for the kinds of claims that most individuals are likely to have. These details—buried in the Bureau’s study among the more conspicuous statements implying

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<sup>6</sup> Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, *Arbitration Study: Report to Congress, pursuant to Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1028(a)* at section 6, pages 48-49 (Mar. 1, 2015) (“CFPB Study”).

<sup>7</sup> *Id.* at section 7, pages 2-3.

<sup>8</sup> *Id.* at section 7, page 6.

<sup>9</sup> *Chamber Comment II* at 9-13; see also William Glaberson, *Despite Cutbacks, Night Court’s Small Dramas Go On*, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2011, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/03/nyregion/despite-cutbacks-new-york-small-claims-courts-trudge-on.html>; Emily Green, *Budget Woes Mean Big Delays For Small Claims Courts*, Nat. Pub. Radio, May 15, 2013, available at <http://www.npr.org/2013/05/17/182640434/budget-woes-mean-big-delays-for-small-claims-courts>.

that class actions are beneficial—in fact offer further proof that most class actions provide no benefit to consumers.

*First*, most cases filed as purported class actions are not resolved in a manner that provides any benefit to absent class members. According to the Bureau’s data, 87% of resolved class actions (excluding claims affected by arbitration agreements) resulted in no benefit to absent class members. Instead, most were dismissed by or settled with the named plaintiff only. The Bureau found that only 12% of putative class actions were finally approved for classwide settlement during the study period.<sup>10</sup>

That is an even smaller than the proportion observed in another study conducted in 2013 by Mayer Brown LLP on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce.<sup>11</sup> That study found that *the overwhelming majority of class actions result in no recovery at all* for members of the putative class. Approximately two-thirds of cases studied were dismissed on the merits by the court, or dismissed voluntarily by the plaintiff.

The Bureau’s report fails to acknowledge it, but the plain fact is that absent class members receive nothing unless a class action is settled on a class-wide basis, or there is a class-wide judgment for plaintiffs (something that almost never happens).

*Second*, even in those cases that do result in class settlements, most class members still receive nothing. The Bureau’s report attempts to tout the purportedly large number of class members “eligible for relief,” but the only relevant metric is the rates at which “eligible” class members actually received relief, typically after submitting claims. In sharp contrast with the flood of statistics provided on other topics—including the numbers of class members eligible for relief when cases settle—the Bureau’s report seemed designed to obscure the proportion of eligible class members who actually submitted claims. Where statistics were available, the Bureau’s study reported a “weighted average claims rate” of just 4%.<sup>12</sup> That comports with the Chamber’s study, which found that (in the handful of cases where statistics were available, and excluding one outlier case involving individual claims worth, on average, over \$2.5 million) the claims rates were miniscule: 0.000006%, 0.33%, 1.5%, 9.66%, and 12%.<sup>13</sup>

The Bureau’s own study thus shows that even in the 13% of class actions that did settle on a classwide basis, approximately 96% of class members received no benefit. The Bureau could have—and should have—provided a precise calculation of the overall likelihood that a class member will receive a benefit in a class action, but even a back-of-the-envelope estimate suggests that claims-made settlements provide very little to the broader set of individuals on whose behalf plaintiffs seek to bring class actions. If an average of 4 percent of class members (weighted by size of the class) made claims in settlements and only 13 percent of class actions result in settlements to begin with, then only a very, very tiny percentage of the members of potential classes ever receive any recovery.

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<sup>10</sup> *Id.* at section 6, page 37.

<sup>11</sup> Mayer Brown LLP, *Do Class Actions Benefit Class Members? An Empirical Analysis of Class Actions* (Dec. 11, 2013) (“*Chamber Study*”), available at <http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/uploads/Documents/PDFs/2013/December/DoClassActionsBenefitClassMembers.pdf>.

<sup>12</sup> *Id.* at section 8, page 30.

<sup>13</sup> *Chamber Study* at 7 & n.20.



Why do the low claims rates in most class actions matter? In determining who benefits, it makes no difference how many people are “eligible” to make claims; all that matters is who follows through and actually receives compensation. As the Chamber’s study explained, there are many reasons why a class member might not submit a claim, such as because he or she believes the modest award is not worth their while, or the process is burdensome, or they do not believe they have been injured in the first place.<sup>14</sup> But whatever their reasons, it is clear that most class members do not submit claims and thus are not made better off by class actions.

The Bureau’s study also reveals other data about how class actions provide little value to individuals (although, again, one has to dig beneath the surface). For example, the study carefully avoids any mention of the *average* amount of payments to class members, instead trumpeting “a total of \$1.1 billion in 251 settlements.” It elsewhere says that 236 settlements involved 34 million class members “who received, or will receive, a cash payment.” Even if one gives the Bureau the benefit of the doubt and assumes that the extra 15 cases included in the first total and not in the second had *no* class members, the average settlement payment in these 251 settlements was \$32.35.<sup>15</sup>

What is more, claimants had to wait significantly longer in class actions than in arbitration to obtain relief. According to the Bureau, class actions that settled on a classwide basis—and for which it was thus even *possible* that a class action could provide benefits to absent class members—took an average of two years to resolve. (The Chamber’s class action study found that some class actions take even longer; 14% of the class actions that the Chamber examined were still pending *four years* after they were filed, with no end in sight).<sup>16</sup> The two-year average duration calculated by the Bureau, moreover, may not even include the time needed for consumers to submit claims and receive payment *after* a settlement is reached. In contrast to the interminable length of most class actions, meanwhile, arbitrations resolved by an arbitrator took between four and eight months to resolve, and those arbitrations that were settled took a mere two to five months.<sup>17</sup>

In sum, the Bureau’s own data reveal that class members in the vast majority of class actions receive no more than a pittance—and then only after a long wait while the lawsuit drags on.

*Third*, the Bureau’s data also shows that while class members receive little, *the lawyers who bring these class actions do very well for themselves*. Based on the Bureau’s report, the average fee paid to plaintiffs’ lawyers—as a percentage of the announced settlement (not the smaller amount actually distributed to class members)—was 41%, with a median of 46%. The total attorneys’ fees in the cases studied by the Bureau added up to \$424 million for 419 cases, which works out to an average of *more than \$1 million per case*.<sup>18</sup> It is telling that the Bureau did not attempt to compare this staggering amount paid to by plaintiffs’ lawyers with the meager amount that class members *actually* received.

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<sup>14</sup> *Id.*

<sup>15</sup> *CFPB Study* at section 8, pages 27-28.

<sup>16</sup> *Chamber Study* at 1.

<sup>17</sup> *Id.* at section 5, page 72; *id.* at section 8, page 37.

<sup>18</sup> *Id.* at section 8, page 33.

These massive attorneys' fees are but one part of the equation: They do not include the other very large transaction costs associated with litigating class actions—the defense costs that companies must pay in all cases, and the cost to the courts of handling these cases. *The Bureau does not even attempt to determine whether the class action system justifies these enormous costs.*

Perhaps the Bureau chose not to try to answer that question because it knew it would not like the answer: our class action system is *not* worth its high costs, because it produces only paltry benefits to consumers. Again, the Bureau found that the average settlement payment in a class action is just \$32. And in many class actions, class members receive far less. Indeed, some class actions result in settlements where class members receive only small coupons; in these coupon cases, as one commentator puts it, “[t]he lawyers ha[ve] a nice payday and most of the class members pitch[] the coupons into the trash.”<sup>19</sup> Professor Martin Redish has decried this phenomenon of “faux class actions,” in which “as a practical matter [class members] will receive no damages” and “[t]he real parties in interest” are “the plaintiffs’ lawyers, who are the ones primarily responsible for bringing th[e] proceeding.”<sup>20</sup>

In some class actions, moreover, plaintiffs receive *literally nothing at all*, because the only relief awarded in the settlement is injunctive relief or *cy pres* relief, which requires the defendant to pay money to a charitable organization. Chief Justice John Roberts has raised concerns about the “fairness” of *cy pres* settlements,<sup>21</sup> and scholars have suggested that they violate absent class members’ due process rights.<sup>22</sup> But despite the fact that injunctive and *cy pres* relief do almost nothing to benefit class members, plaintiffs’ attorneys eagerly pursue both, because “class counsel’s interest in maximizing its fees is satisfied regardless of whether the settlement funds are paid to class members or distributed *cy pres*.”<sup>23</sup>

*Fourth*, contrary to the Bureau’s assertions, our abusive and wasteful class action system is not necessary to allow consumers with small claims to vindicate their rights effectively. Indeed, in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in *American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant*, both the majority *and* the dissent rejected that notion. The dissent, written by Justice Kagan and joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, identified several different ways in which consumers could effectively vindicate even small claims in arbitration without the use of class action procedures:

In this case, . . . the [arbitration] agreement could have prohibited class arbitration without offending the effective vindication rule *if* it had provided an

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<sup>19</sup> Rob Berger, *The CFPB Declares War on Arbitration*, Forbes, Oct. 18, 2015, available at <http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertberger/2015/10/18/the-cfpb-declares-war-on-arbitration>.

<sup>20</sup> Testimony of Martin H. Redish at 7, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, *Hearing: Class Actions Seven Years After the Class Action Fairness Act* (June 1, 2012), available at [http://judiciary.house.gov/\\_files/hearings/Hearings%202012/Redish%2006012012.pdf](http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/Hearings%202012/Redish%2006012012.pdf).

<sup>21</sup> See *Marek v. Lane*, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (noting the many “fundamental concerns surrounding the use of [*cy pres*] remedies in class action litigation”).

<sup>22</sup> Martin H. Redish et al., *Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action*, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 617, 650 (2010).

<sup>23</sup> Rhonda Wasserman, *Cy Pres in Class Action Settlements*, 88 S. Cal. L. Rev. 97, 123 (2014).

alternative mechanism to share, shift or reduce the necessary costs. The agreement's problem is that it bars not just class actions, but also all mechanisms . . . for joinder or consolidation of claims, informal coordination among individual claimants, or amelioration of arbitral expenses.<sup>24</sup>

Consumers increasingly have access to arbitration systems that provide all of the features that the *Italian Colors* dissent identified as necessary to allow for effective, individual vindication of small claims. For example, many companies now have arbitration agreements that "shift" the "costs" of arbitration to the company and provide bonus and incentive payments to consumers who prevail.<sup>25</sup> It is also easier than ever before for individual claimants to coordinate their claims by sharing the same lawyer, expert, and other elements required to prove a claim. For example, an entrepreneurial plaintiffs' lawyer can recruit large numbers of clients (via the internet, social media, or other similar means), file thousands of individual arbitration demands on behalf of those clients, and distribute common costs over all those claimants, making the costs for expert witnesses and fact development negligible on a per-claimant basis.

There are thus multiple alternatives to private class action lawsuits in court brought by entrepreneurial plaintiffs' attorneys; these alternatives afford individual consumers and employees actual opportunities to pursue their disputes or otherwise vindicate their rights—*in sharp contrast to the false promise of private class actions*.

*Fifth*, in an attempt to sidestep the facts that class actions often provide no benefit to class members and are unnecessary to vindicate small consumer claims, the Bureau contends in its October 2015 rulemaking announcement that class actions also serve the broader social purpose of deterring wrongdoing. By threatening companies that violate the law with huge liability, the Bureau claims, class actions "strengthen[] incentives for [companies] to engage in robust compliance."<sup>26</sup> But this deterrence argument doesn't hold water.

In order for class actions to deter wrongdoing, parties must fear that they will be subject to class action liability if they act wrongfully. But plaintiffs' lawyers don't choose which class actions to bring based on the merits of the underlying claims; rather, they simply look for *any* claims that can withstand a motion to dismiss and satisfy the standards for class certification. These lawyers know that, as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has observed, once a class is certified, the "potentially ruinous liability" facing a defendant "places pressure on the defendant to settle even unmeritorious claims."<sup>27</sup> In any case where class certification is granted, the rational thing for a defendant to do is settle rather than risk going to trial, even if it has done nothing wrong; as one appellate judge has put it, class certification "is, in effect, the whole case."<sup>28</sup> The Bureau's

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<sup>24</sup> *Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.*, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2318 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting).

<sup>25</sup> *See Chamber Comment II* at 31-36 (collecting arbitration agreements).

<sup>26</sup> CFPB Proposal at 15.

<sup>27</sup> *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1465 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).

<sup>28</sup> Hon. Diane Wood, Circuit Judge, Remarks at the FTC Workshop: Protecting Consumer Interests in Class Actions (Sept. 13-14, 2004), in *Panel 2: Tools for Ensuring that Settlements are "Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate,"* 18 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1197, 1213 (2005).

own findings back up this analysis: the Bureau found that classwide judgments for plaintiffs on the merits after a trial are virtually unheard of, occurring in “less than 1% of cases.”<sup>29</sup>

Because the threat of class action liability is a function of who plaintiffs’ lawyers sue, rather than of whether a business who has engaged in actual wrongdoing, class actions cannot—and do not—generally deter wrongful conduct. On the contrary, even law-abiding businesses must treat class actions as an inevitable cost of doing business.

Businesses are far more likely to be deterred from wrongdoing by the reputational consequences of engaging in improper behavior, because reputational harm is often directly correlated to a business’s success or failure. In the age of social media, consumer complaints can quickly go viral on Facebook, Twitter, and change.org (to name a few examples). That phenomenon impacts companies immediately and directly leads to changes in practices that garner consumer opposition. Class actions, by contrast, rarely, if ever, have that effect.

**C. *Government enforcement plays a significant role in protecting consumers.***

Companies *are* likely, however, to be deterred by the threat of government enforcement action. That is especially the case in light of the enhanced government enforcement capabilities in the consumer financial protection space. Not only are the monetary penalties higher, but an enforcement action brought by the government reflects the government’s judgment that its limited resources should be used to combat what it considers improper activity.<sup>30</sup>

Of course, not all government enforcement actions are brought against covered persons who have actually engaged in wrongdoing. But while companies view class actions as a cost of doing business—rent seeking by any one of a large number of entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyers who are banking on the possibility that they may be able to coerce a settlement—companies are far more likely to take notice of a government enforcement action. For that reason, government enforcement plays a significant role in protecting consumers. That role is likely to increase substantially given the Bureau’s supervision and enforcement authority.

The Bureau’s study provides zero support for class action proponents’ common claim that class actions play an important role in supplementing government enforcement efforts. The Bureau found, for example, that most government enforcement is independent of private lawsuits. Less than 9% of government enforcement actions were preceded by a private class action.<sup>31</sup>

For cases in which there was no government enforcement action (6%), the study does not indicate how much consumers actually received under class action settlements. (It only provides “gross” numbers.) It is therefore impossible to determine whether these settlements actually provided meaningful consumer benefits. It is also impossible to determine what amount of these settlements companies actually paid out – the amount that would be relevant if, contrary to the evidence, companies were deterred by the prospect of settling class actions brought by entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyers.

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<sup>29</sup> CFPB Study at section 6, page 37.

<sup>30</sup> *Id.* at section 9, page 12.

<sup>31</sup> *Id.* at section 9, page 14.

Most importantly, the study period ended in 2012, and therefore *entirely fails to take account of the effect of the Bureau's own fully functioning enforcement and supervision programs*. In the year ending December 31, 2012, the Bureau was a party to 9 enforcement actions.<sup>32</sup> In the year ending September 30, 2014, there were 41 public enforcement actions.<sup>33</sup> And the Bureau has used its supervisory authority to conduct hundreds of examinations.<sup>34</sup> The Bureau also provides a forum in which consumers can file complaints against financial institutions; it reports that financial institutions have already responded to *more than 450,000 of these complaints, with 98% of consumers receiving a timely response*.<sup>35</sup>

The entire reason for creating the Bureau was to increase enforcement of consumer laws: the Bureau's existence, combined with the numerous other state, local, and federal enforcement agencies, underscores that class actions have little, if any, role to play in this context—unless the Bureau does not believe that its significant resources and authority will provide consumers with additional protection.

Moreover, the Bureau is likely to focus on the precise types of wrongdoing that are susceptible to class actions: misconduct that affects a large number of consumers. And the Bureau's examination authority, combined with its enforcement activities and consumer complaint database, make it highly likely that the Bureau will detect such wrongdoing. The Bureau's enforcement powers therefore provide an additional, significant factor why the threat of class actions is irrelevant to deterring wrongful conduct in this context.

**D. *The Bureau's study does little to evaluate—or even describe—the procedures available in arbitration that afford consumers with fair, faster, and less expensive dispute resolution compared with litigation.***

The Bureau's own study reveals that—especially in contrast to class action litigation—arbitration provides consumers with effective procedures that enable them to obtain relief on claims that would be impractical to pursue in court.

The reasons that consumers cannot pursue most of their potential claims in court are (1) the claims are too small to attract a lawyer (typically more than \$50,000 must be at issue in order to do so), and (2) the claims are too individualized to be addressed in a class action.

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<sup>32</sup> *Semi-Annual Report of the CFPB*, March 2013, at 66, available at [http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303\\_CFPB\\_SemiAnnualReport\\_March2013.pdf](http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_CFPB_SemiAnnualReport_March2013.pdf).

<sup>33</sup> *Semi-Annual Report of the CFPB*, Fall 2014, at 103, available at [http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201412\\_cfpb\\_semi-annual-report-fall-2014.pdf](http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201412_cfpb_semi-annual-report-fall-2014.pdf).

<sup>34</sup> *CFPB Supervisory Highlights*, Spring 2014, at 5, available at [http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201405\\_cfpb\\_supervisory-highlights-spring-2014.pdf](http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201405_cfpb_supervisory-highlights-spring-2014.pdf) (“In 2013, the CFPB conducted over one hundred supervisory activities—such as full scope reviews and subsequent follow-up examinations—and plans to conduct approximately 150 of these activities in 2014.”).

<sup>35</sup> Berger, *supra* note 19.

Consumers who use arbitration get decisions on the merits more frequently and more quickly than they would in court. Consumers win at least as often, if not more often, than they do in court.<sup>36</sup> And companies pay most of the fees associated with arbitration.<sup>37</sup>

The Bureau made no serious effort to examine the benefits of arbitration because it did not make any qualitative effort to assess how arbitration's procedures work and whether those procedures would facilitate the ability of consumers to bring claims.

But even the narrow examination of arbitration that the Bureau *did* undertake confirms arbitration's advantages:

- ***More of consumers' affirmative claims were decided on the merits:*** 24% in arbitrations, compared to less than 8% in litigation (and all but three of those were default judgments).<sup>38</sup> The success rate for consumers was even higher—27.2%—in the subset of arbitrations where the consumer brought affirmative claims but did not dispute any alleged debts.<sup>39</sup>
- In arbitrations resolved by arbitrators involving affirmative claims by consumers where data on the amount of the award was available, consumers received relief on 32 claims on the merits; the average payment to consumers was \$5,389, and the median amount was \$2,682.<sup>40</sup> Those awards are ***significantly greater than the relief to claimants in class action settlements.***
- The one reported court award was \$4,925; the average settlement was \$2,128; and the median amount was \$1,001. Those consumers who were able to use arbitration to obtain a merits decision did much better.
- ***Consumers did better without a lawyer than with one:*** as two prominent scholars at George Mason University explain in a critique of the Bureau's study, the Bureau's data showed that "self-represented plaintiffs were seven times more likely than represented plaintiffs to get an AAA arbitrator's decision in their favor." That finding, they conclude,

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<sup>36</sup> Compare Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, *An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer Arbitrations*, 25 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 843, 898 (2010) (studying claims filed with the American Arbitration Association and concluding that consumers win relief 53.3% of the time), with Theodore Eisenberg et al., *Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal Courts: A Statistical Portrait*, 19 Seattle U. L. Rev. 433, 437 (1996) (observing that in 1991-92, plaintiffs won 51% of jury trials in state court and 56% of jury trials in federal court, while in 1979-1993 plaintiffs won 50% of jury trials).

<sup>37</sup> Elizabeth Hill, *Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association*, 18 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 777, 802 (2003) (finding that lower-income employees "paid no forum fees" in 61% of the cases studied; employees also paid no attorney's fees in 32% of the cases).

<sup>38</sup> See *id.* at section 6, pages 48-49.

<sup>39</sup> *Id.* at section 5, page 39.

<sup>40</sup> *Id.* at section 5, page 41.

suggests that in arbitration, “hiring an attorney offers little value to a consumer and is often unnecessary.”<sup>41</sup>

To the extent the Bureau does discuss the terms of arbitration agreements, it presents a false and misleading picture of the arbitral process.

The Bureau recites various provisions of certain arbitration agreements—for example, provisions that bar punitive or consequential damages, limit the time period for filing claims, or require hearings in particular locations, or permit a company to recover attorneys’ fees whenever it prevails.<sup>42</sup> But the Bureau fails to explain that courts have routinely and consistently invalidated such provisions on state-law unconscionability grounds—a point that the Chamber has made fully clear to the Bureau.<sup>43</sup> That omission is an obvious attempt by the Bureau to create the patently erroneous impression that such provisions are being applied in practice simply because they are included in the terms of some arbitration agreements.

Even more troubling, the Bureau simply failed even to mention—much less analyze—the extent to which arbitration creates incentives for companies to settle individual claims or disputes even before the filing of a formal arbitration proceeding. Because businesses subsidize most or all of the costs of arbitration—under AAA consumer rules, for example, a business must cover at least \$1500 in filing fees<sup>44</sup>—it is economically rational for every business that is subject to an arbitration provision to settle disputes of less than \$2,000-5,000 before an arbitration is commenced. That incentive is lacking in court, where the cost burden falls on the consumer.

In addition, many arbitration agreements create significant incentives to settle claims before arbitration begins, such as through arbitration provisions that—like the provision at issue in *AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion*—contain potential bonus payments to customers who do better in arbitration than a company’s last settlement offer (providing, for example, that the customer will be awarded a minimum amount, often \$5,000-10,000, plus attorneys’ fees and, often, other costs). It is thus a straightforward matter of economics that, if a consumer has a dispute with a company of less than the bonus figure—and the claim is not frivolous or abusive—the company has every reason to settle by offering a payment (often for the full amount of the claim plus an amount for attorneys’ fees) that satisfies the customer.

The Supreme Court explained in *Concepcion* that the consumers’ claim in that case was “most unlikely to go unresolved” because the arbitration provision at issue provided that the company would pay the *Concepcions* a minimum of \$7,500 and twice their attorneys fees if they obtained an award “greater than AT&T’s last settlement offer.”<sup>45</sup> And this self-imposed incentive to settle occurs not just at the stages of a formally commenced arbitration or the pre-

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<sup>41</sup> Jason Scott Johnston & Todd Zywicki, *The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Arbitration Study: A Summary and Critique* 26 (Mercatus Ctr., George Mason Univ., Working Paper, Aug. 2015), available at [http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working\\_papers/LS1507.pdf](http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/LS1507.pdf).

<sup>42</sup> *Id.* at section 2, pages 45-64.

<sup>43</sup> *Chamber Comment II* at 23-28.

<sup>44</sup> AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules at 34, available at <https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTAGE2021425&>.

<sup>45</sup> *AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion*, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).

arbitration negotiation period. Instead, large numbers of AT&T customers have their concerns resolved at a much earlier point by calling or e-mailing AT&T's customer care department, which is remarkably effective: the record in *Concepcion* indicated that AT&T representatives awarded more than \$1.3 billion in compensation to customers during a single twelve-month period in response to customer concerns and complaints.

The Supreme Court, and other courts, have found that provisions like these give companies a very significant incentive to settle even marginally meritorious claims on terms favorable to claimants—in order to avoid the downside risk of losing and having to pay the bonus amount.<sup>46</sup> That confers an important benefit not available in litigation, and one that cannot be quantified by looking at the results of arbitration proceedings. But the Bureau failed to examine the issue.

The Bureau also failed to examine how a well-functioning arbitration system works in practice. For example, the Bureau could have—but did not—study the arbitration system for the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan in California, which has more than seven million members. The Kaiser arbitration system gets high marks from health plan members, who have been involved in arbitration proceedings, most of them over medical malpractice claims. According to a 2013 survey conducted by Kaiser's independent arbitration administrator, almost 50% of the parties and attorneys who went through arbitrations that year reported that the arbitration system was better than going to court, another 38% reported that it was the same as going to court—and only 14% reported it was worse.<sup>47</sup> It also could have studied the use of arbitration in the securities industry.<sup>48</sup> *It did neither.*

The CFPB's December 2013 preliminary results of its arbitration study—attached as the Appendix A to the CFPB's report—suggest that few individuals bring small dollar claims in arbitration.<sup>49</sup> But for several reasons, the number of formal claims filed by consumers in arbitration and in court says nothing about the accessibility and fairness of the two methods of dispute resolution.

*First*, consumers' claims are often resolved before the filing of a formal arbitration proceeding. Individuals who file arbitration demands—just like those who file small claims court cases or lawsuits in court—are almost always a very small group of consumers whose

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<sup>46</sup> See *id.*; see also *Coneff v. AT&T Corp.*, 673 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that 'the *Concepcion* Court [had] examined this very arbitration agreement' and concluded 'that aggrieved customers who filed claims would be essentially guaranteed to be made whole' because "the arbitration agreement [at issue] has a number of fee-shifting and otherwise pro-consumer provisions") (quoting *Cruz v. Cingular Wireless*, 648 F.3d 1205, 1215 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing *Concepcion*, 131 S. Ct. at 1753)).

<sup>47</sup> *Annual Report of the Office of the Independent Administrator of the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. Mandatory Arbitration System for Disputes with Health Plan Members, January 1, 2014 – December 31, 2014 at 44, available at <http://www.oia-kaiserarb.com/pdfs/2014-Annual-Report.pdf>.*

<sup>48</sup> Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., *Dispute Resolution Statistics* (April 2015), available at <https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/dispute-resolution-statistics> (noting that customer was awarded damages in 39 to 47 percent of customer claimant cases decided in arbitration over last five years, and that in 2013 "approximately 77 percent of customer claimant [arbitration] cases resulted, through settlements or awards, in monetary or non-monetary recovery for the investor").

<sup>49</sup> CFPB Study at Appendix A, pages 76-82.



concerns were not resolved through less-formal customer service mechanisms. When companies have millions of customers, it is likely that thousands—perhaps tens of thousands—of customers will at some point in their relationship have concerns that may or may not develop into full-fledged disputes. But the vast majority of those customer concerns are resolved through informal channels, such as customer service processes, negotiation, or mediation, before a concern ripens into a dispute and a formal arbitration demand is filed. As the George Mason professors explain in their critique of the Bureau’s study, it is good business for a company to resolve as many consumer disputes as possible informally: when consumers are dissatisfied, they can and do “take their . . . business elsewhere.”<sup>50</sup>

Indeed, the George Mason scholars found that at one bank they examined, consumers who sought voluntary refunds from the bank successfully obtained them 68% of the time.<sup>51</sup> Thus, they concluded, it may well be that “the overwhelming number of meritorious complaints” against businesses are “resolved consensually rather than by conflict” and that “those denied a refund do not arbitrate [because] their complaints lack merit.”<sup>52</sup>

Even when internal dispute resolution mechanisms fail and consumers do file for arbitration, there are significant incentives for businesses to settle claims before arbitration begins. As explained above (at pages 11-12), businesses subsidize most or all of the costs of arbitration, and many have adopted arbitration agreements that provide for potential bonus payments to customers who do better in arbitration than a company’s last settlement offer. Significantly, a great many arbitration provisions require the company involved to pay all or nearly all of the arbitration costs, and many of the provisions include bonus provisions. Those agreements provide a very powerful incentive for pre-arbitration settlement of any non-frivolous consumer claim of \$5,000 or less.

*Second*, a concerted campaign to invalidate arbitration agreements was underway for the period studied by the Bureau. Plaintiffs’ lawyers vigorously resisted arbitration (with success in certain “magnet” jurisdictions for class actions) before *Concepcion*. And after the Supreme Court held in *Concepcion* that class waivers in arbitration agreements are enforceable, the plaintiffs’ bar has continued to search for ways to avoid their clients’ agreements to resolve their disputes in arbitration. The unfortunate effect of these widespread efforts is that lawyers who represent consumers and their allies in consumer advocacy organizations have discouraged consumers from pursuing their disputes in simplified, often cost-free arbitration.

*Third*, the Bureau examined the records of just one arbitration provider, the American Arbitration Association (AAA), ignoring the other arbitral forums open to consumers. In particular, consumers are increasingly using online dispute resolution providers to handle their small claims: one such online company, Modria, handles more than *60 million disputes per year*.<sup>53</sup> By focusing solely on the AAA, the Bureau failed to capture a significant portion of the arbitrations that happen today.

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<sup>50</sup> Johnston & Zywicki, *supra* note 41, at 30.

<sup>51</sup> *Id.* at 38.

<sup>52</sup> *Id.*

<sup>53</sup> See <http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2012-0017-0019> (Modria comment submitted to CFPB June 19, 2012).

*Finally*, the focus on “small-value” claims presents a misleading picture of arbitration. The Bureau arbitrarily reported the incidence of claims involving \$1,000 or less and then concludes that few consumers arbitrate small claims.<sup>54</sup> But that definition is odd, given that—based on information compiled by the CFPB’s own December 2013 preliminary results—most state small-claims courts permit the assertion of claims of up to \$10,000.<sup>55</sup>

Hopefully, the Bureau did not adopt this overly narrow definition in order to be able to assert, erroneously, that consumers do not use arbitration for small claims. In addition, of course, this analysis ignores entirely the fact, discussed above, that the terms of a growing number of arbitration agreements provide a very substantial incentive for the pre-arbitration settlement of such claims.

In sum, the Bureau’s examination of how arbitration works is patently inadequate, and will undermine the validity of any regulations that the Bureau might attempt to promulgate.

**E. *The Bureau’s survey of consumers reveals only that consumers do not focus on dispute resolution when choosing among consumer financial products and services.***

The Bureau’s study touts the results of a telephonic survey in asserting that consumers are uninformed about the dispute resolution terms of their credit card agreements. But that survey is completely irrelevant to determining whether regulation of arbitration is “in the public interest and for the protection of consumers.”<sup>56</sup>

That is because the Bureau refused to obtain information about consumers’ baseline level of knowledge of other key provisions of their card agreements.<sup>57</sup> Without that comparative baseline, the Bureau cannot determine whether consumers pay greater, less, or the

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<sup>54</sup> CFPB Study at Appendix A, page 14.

<sup>55</sup> *Id.* at Appendix A, pages 160-61.

<sup>56</sup> The Bureau also cites a paper describing a web survey that was authored by Professor Jeff Sovern of St. Johns’ Law School (among others). But the Bureau’s discussion of that study fails to disclose (as Professor Sovern does) that the study was paid for from a grant by the American Association of Justice—*i.e.*, the trial lawyers who benefit from class action attorneys’ fee awards and therefore are invested in maintaining the class action system. Moreover, Sovern’s web survey also fails to ask participants about any contract provision *other* than the arbitration clause. It is telling (and quite unfortunate) that the Bureau’s survey suffers from the same problem that the trial-lawyer-funded Sovern study does. See CFPB Study at section 3, pages 7-8 (citing Jeff Sovern, Elayne E. Greenberg, Paul F. Kirgis, and Yuxiang Liu, “Whimsy Little Contracts” With Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Respondent Understanding of Arbitration Agreements (Oct. 29, 2014), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2516432>).

<sup>57</sup> The Chamber repeatedly urged the Bureau to obtain such information, but the Bureau refused to do so. See Letter from David Hirschmann & Lisa Rickard, Re: “Telephone Survey Exploring Consumer Awareness of and Perceptions Regarding Dispute Resolution Provisions in Credit Card Agreements,” Docket No. CFPB-2013-0016 (June 30, 2014), available at <http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2014-0011-0015>; Letter from David Hirschmann & Lisa Rickard to Matthew Burton & PRA Office, Re: “Telephone Survey Exploring Consumer Awareness of and Perceptions Regarding Dispute Resolution Provisions in Credit Card Agreements,” Docket No. CFPB-2013-0016 (Aug. 6, 2013), <http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2013-0016-0015>.

same attention to dispute resolution clauses as to other clauses important to them—and why that might be so. As a result, the Bureau was not able to place information regarding dispute resolution systems in context—and thereby derive information that might be relevant to assessing consumers’ relative awareness of arbitration agreements versus other credit card contract provisions. The Bureau’s failure to elicit such information renders the survey data meaningless.

Indeed, the approach taken by the Bureau in constructing the survey unfortunately suggests that the Bureau’s analysis is results-oriented. Any neutral evaluation of credit card agreements would have not just inquired about dispute resolution provisions but also about other provisions as comparators (such as whether consumers recalled the interest rate or credit limit). Why didn’t the Bureau ask such a basic question? In the absence of an explanation from the Bureau, observers are left to conclude that obtaining such information would not serve the Bureau’s pre-ordained goals. If consumers do recall their interest rates and credit limits, that result would confirm that dispute resolution is not as salient as other terms (like the price of credit); and if they did not, that response would indicate that consumers simply don’t recall any of the elements of the credit card deal once they have entered into it, even those that are undoubtedly important to their decision. Either way, the irrelevance of the Bureau’s survey approach would have been confirmed.

The only data that the Bureau’s study delivers is that, unsurprisingly, consumers are not focused on arbitration clauses: *Not one consumer* (of 1,007 who completed the survey) volunteered dispute resolution procedures as a feature relevant to selection of their credit card. Even when asked to respond to each of a list of nine elements, dispute resolution was the least-selected choice.

That finding is entirely unsurprising. As we have seen, businesses have a strong incentive to resolve consumer disputes internally in order to keep consumers’ business. Thus, as the George Mason scholars explain, “consumers prefer the market to [a] legal response for perceived service failures”; if they do not get satisfaction from a company, they simply take their business elsewhere. And “[g]iven the effectiveness of this market response, consumers do not *need* to know anything about” whether their agreement with a company provides for arbitration or litigation.<sup>58</sup>

#### F. *Arbitration clauses lead to lower prices for consumers.*

It cannot be debated that litigation in court—especially class-action litigation—imposes substantial transaction costs on businesses. Because arbitration offers a less-expensive forum for the resolution of disputes, it should reduce the transaction costs that businesses bear in the judicial system, and basic economic principles teach that some portion of those cost savings will be passed along to consumers.<sup>59</sup>

Here’s how Professor Stephen Ware explains this phenomenon:

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<sup>58</sup> Johnston & Zywicki, *supra* note 41, at 30, 32.

<sup>59</sup> See *Chamber Comment II* at 37-38, 54-55.

- “The consensus view is that businesses using adhesive arbitration agreements do so because those businesses generally find that those agreements lower their dispute resolution costs.”
- “In the case of consumer arbitration agreements, this benefit to businesses is also a benefit to consumers. That is because whatever lowers costs to businesses tends over time to lower prices to consumers.”
- “The extent to which cost-savings are passed on to consumers is determined by the elasticity of supply and demand in the relevant markets. Therefore, the size of the price reduction caused by enforcement of consumer arbitration agreements will vary, as will the time it takes to occur.”
- “But it is inconsistent with basic economics to question the existence of the price reduction.”<sup>60</sup>

The Bureau’s analysis of whether consumers experience cost savings from arbitration is “inconsistent with basic economics,” because it claims that cost savings are absent.

The report does include caveats that would allow a careful reader to understand that, in fact, the Bureau’s analysis is of little value. Unfortunately, the Bureau failed to highlight those cautions. That said, the Bureau acknowledges that:

- “[t]he assertion that pre-dispute arbitration clauses generate cost savings, in itself, is difficult to test and has not been established or disproved”;
- “[w]hether such savings, to the extent they exist, are passed along to consumers is even more difficult to establish or disprove”;
- “[i]mportantly, even a correlation between the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses and price levels should not be construed as a casual relationship between the two, absent additional information.”<sup>61</sup>

Despite these acknowledgments – which should have caused the Bureau to undertake a robust analysis rather than a rushed one – the Bureau proceeded to focus on the implications of one particular lawsuit (*Ross v. Bank of America*) in which some settling credit card issuers agreed not to use arbitration for a 3-½ year period.<sup>62</sup> The question the Bureau asked is “whether it can find statistically significant evidence, at standard confidence level (95%), that companies that eliminated arbitration raised their prices (measured by total cost of credit) in a manner that was different from that of comparable companies that had not changed their policies regarding arbitration provisions.”<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Stephen J. Ware, *The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—With Particular Consideration Of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees*, 5 *J. Am. Arbitration* 251, 254-57 (2006) (emphasis added; footnotes omitted; citing, *inter alia*, Richard Posner, *Economic Analysis of Law* (6th ed. 2003)).

<sup>61</sup> *CFPB Study* at section 10, page 5.

<sup>62</sup> *Id.* at section 10, pages 6 & n.14 (citing *Ross v. Bank of America*, No. 05-cv-7116 (S.D.N.Y.)).

<sup>63</sup> *Id.* at section 10, pages 5-6.

But as the Bureau acknowledges (in a footnote), “the result” of its analysis “has limitations.”<sup>64</sup> That is a serious understatement. To begin with, while the study uses the language of scientific analysis—describing the settling credit card issuers as a “treatment group” and other issuers as a “control group”—the Bureau states that the “control group” “may or may not have used pre-dispute arbitration provisions” at all.<sup>65</sup> To be blunt, the Bureau is saying “there was no control group.”<sup>66</sup>

Next, the Bureau was incorrect to assume that issuers who agreed to the arbitration moratorium would definitely raise prices if arbitration had produced cost savings for them. As the George Mason scholars explained in their critique of the Bureau’s study, “the moratorium was only temporary. There is *neither theoretical nor empirical reason* to have thought that such a temporary change in costs would change credit card pricing.”<sup>67</sup>

Finally, and most troubling of all, the Bureau’s report never assesses whether issuers that used arbitration agreements during the time frame studied actually had experienced any cost savings from the use of arbitration—if there were no cost savings, there would be no price increase when arbitration was eliminated. And when one looks at the time frame studied by the Bureau, it is apparent that there were virtually no cost savings to be had because of the state of the law during that time. Specifically, the Bureau purported to examine the total cost of credit (a defined term subject to its own limitations) with a “before” period from November 2008 to October 2009 and an “after” period from January 2010 to November 2011.<sup>68</sup> But the problem with this time frame is that virtually all of it occurred before the Supreme Court decided *AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*<sup>69</sup> in late April 2011—*i.e.*, when arbitration clauses were routinely not being enforced in magnet jurisdictions for consumer class actions (including California, New Jersey, Illinois, and Washington state). When courts do not enforce arbitration agreements and allow class-action lawsuits to proceed, it is self-evident that the company that is party to an arbitration agreement will not experience reduced transaction costs from arbitration.

Economic theory (and common sense) suggest that, in the absence of reduced transaction costs to businesses, there are no cost savings to pass along to consumers. There is no doubt that, as a result of *Concepcion*, courts are today enforcing fair arbitration agreements, compelling arbitration, and dismissing class action lawsuits. As a result, credit card issuers are *now* experiencing reduced transaction costs because of arbitration, and it is reasonable to expect that some of the cost savings from arbitration place downward pressure on the price of credit (although other types of regulation, including by the CFPB, have placed upward pressure on those prices). But the Bureau’s study asks the wrong question by focusing on a time frame

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<sup>64</sup> *Id.* at section 10, page 8.

<sup>65</sup> *Id.* at section 10, page 8.

<sup>66</sup> Bizarrely, the report does not identify specific issuers “[f]or maximum protection of supervisory data.” *Id.* at section 10, page 8 n.18. In light of the fact that the Bureau maintains an online database of credit card agreements (<http://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/agreements/>), this rationale for concealing information about issuers seems doubtful.

<sup>67</sup> Johnston & Zywicki, *supra* note 41, at 34 (emphasis added).

<sup>68</sup> *CFPB Study* at section 10, page 9.

<sup>69</sup> 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).

when no reasonable person would contend that arbitration agreements were being enforced with the regularity needed to lead to reduced transaction costs.

Unlike the retrospective analysis the Bureau undertook focusing on the wrong time frame, the real question, as a matter of public policy, is whether the elimination of pre-dispute arbitration in consumer financial service contracts will force financial services companies to increase prices to customers, and whether the benefits of class action litigation are worth imposing the costs of a CFPB “regulatory tax.” The answer to that question seems clear: “[f]orcing consumers and financial institutions to litigate class action lawsuits will impose enormous costs on what are relatively low-cost transactions,” and these enormous costs will surely “make [their] way to the cost and benefits of the financial products being regulated,” making consumers *worse off*, rather than better off.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> Berger, *supra* note 19.