

# Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

February 4, 2025

The Honorable Donald J. Trump  
President of the United States  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Trump,

We are deeply concerned over press reports indicating that individuals associated with the “Department of Government Efficiency,” or “DOGE,” task force have demanded entry to federal government facilities, including access to classified spaces and sensitive government data and information systems. Reporting indicates that these individuals have sought access to government facilities and data in a highly irregular fashion, putting at risk sensitive data and classified information. It is also unclear what such actions and information have to do with achieving the intended purpose of the DOGE.

For example, on February 1, 2025, it was reported that individuals affiliated with DOGE forcibly accessed the offices of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) on a weekend day and without advanced notice or coordination. Reports indicate that these individuals, some of whom may not have any formal government affiliation, security clearance, or discernible need-to-know, threatened on-site security personnel and demanded potentially improper access to government facilities and information systems, including sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIFs) and the classified materials and systems therein. We also understand that members of your administration subsequently placed security officials and others at USAID on administrative leave because of their efforts to follow established security procedures and prevent the unauthorized access of classified U.S. government information without the necessary security clearances.

Similarly, we are concerned by reports about individuals affiliated with DOGE gaining access to sensitive personnel data systems at the Office of Personnel Management as well as the Bureau of the Fiscal Service’s payment systems at the Department of Treasury. If not appropriately safeguarded, irregular or improper access to data contained in these systems could compromise the privacy of individuals, as well as elevate counterintelligence risks.

The events at USAID are particularly troubling, but they are not an isolated issue. The Executive Order empowering DOGE appears to envision and authorize DOGE “teams” at all Executive Branch agencies, to include the Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Justice, and the Intelligence Community. These agencies all hold large volumes of classified information, and bypassing established safeguards to protect such information could irreparably damage national security. Whatever DOGE’s mission entails, a highly irregular process in which security officials are threatened and punished for following laws and policies designed to protect sensitive information is unacceptable and dangerous. It is critical that the Administration make clear how and whether Mr. Musk, government and non-government employees, as well as foreign citizens affiliated with DOGE, are appropriately vetted and cleared to


access sensitive information, how they are safeguarding the facilities, information, and systems they are accessing, and what functions and spending are included in their mandate.

These concerning reports raise urgent questions which we expect the Administration to provide transparent answers no later than February 14, 2025:

1. *There is an existing mechanism for those with appropriate security clearances and demonstrated need-to-know to access government facilities. Did DOGE affiliates possess the necessary clearances to access sensitive government facilities, including SCIFs, at USAID or any other agency?*
2. *For any cleared individuals, did they follow appropriate rules and regulations for transmitting clearances and coordinating their visit so that they may legally access classified spaces and materials at USAID, Treasury, OPM, or other federal departments or agencies?*
3. *Were any DOGE affiliates holders of a security clearance issued by the White House Counsel's Office pursuant to the January 20, 2025, Executive Order titled "Memorandum to Resolve the Backlog of Security Clearances for Executive Office of the President"? If so, what level of clearance and access was granted, and was any vetting conducted to identify foreign ties or other security risks?*
4. *Were any of these individuals ultimately able to access USAID facilities, files, and systems at any point following the incident on February 1, 2025? If so, did they access any classified, sensitive, or personally identifiable information (PII) of any Americans – either U.S. government employees or implementing partners – in the process?*
5. *Provide a full accounting for the number of personnel associated with DOGE, broken down by U.S. government employees, U.S. government contractors, non-government employees, and foreign citizens. For non-governmental employees associated with DOGE, what compensation do they receive and what is the source of that compensation?*
6. *What other agencies have DOGE teams associated with them? Provide specific details concerning their interactions with these agencies, including the mechanisms through which they seek access to agency information and personnel.*
7. *How do personnel affiliated with DOGE utilize and safeguard classified, sensitive, and PII that they access? Are personnel aware of the legal requirements surrounding the protection of this information?*
8. *With respect to DOGE access to the Treasury Department Bureau of the Fiscal Service payment system, has there been any counterintelligence evaluation of the risks associated with that access, and the potential for discovery and disclosure of classified activities in that data?*

Given the legal requirements to handle classified, sensitive, and personally identifiable information, we seek a swift explanation of how DOGE personnel's intrusion into and access to secure government spaces, data, and information systems comport with U.S. law and national security interests. DOGE's current approach appears to pose enormous risks to national security and to the privacy and civil liberties of Americans.

Sincerely,



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James A. Himes  
Ranking Member  
House Permanent Select Committee  
on Intelligence



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Adam Smith  
Ranking Member  
House Committee on Armed Services



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Gregory W. Meeks  
Ranking Member  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs



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Gerald E. Connolly  
Ranking Member  
House Committee on Oversight  
and Government Reform



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Jamie Raskin  
Ranking Member  
House Committee on the Judiciary



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Richard E. Neal  
Ranking Member  
House Committee on Ways and Means



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Maxine Waters  
Ranking Member  
House Committee on Financial Services